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A new brand of plaintiff has come to federal court. In cases involving the
Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act, and partisan gerrymandering,
government institutions have brought suit to redress “institutional injuries”—that is,
claims of harm to their constitutional powers or duties. Jurists and scholars are
increasingly enthusiastic about these lawsuits, arguing (for example) that the Senate
should have standing to protect its power to ratify treaties; that the House of
Representatives may sue to preserve its role in the appropriations process; and that
the President may go to court to vindicate his Article II prerogatives. This Article
contends, however, that government standing to assert “institutional injuries” rests on
a fundamental misunderstanding of our constitutional scheme. The provisions of our
structural Constitution are not designed for the benefit of institutions. Instead, the
Constitution divides power between the federal government and the States and
among the branches of the federal government for the benefit of the entire public.
Government institutions have no greater interest in their official powers than any
other member of society. Moreover, as this Article demonstrates, denying government
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standing to assert “institutional injuries” is not only consistent with constitutional
structure, history, and precedent, but also reminds us of a basic principle: Individuals,
not institutions, are the rightsholders in our constitutional system.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a new plaintiff in town. Government institutions are heading to
federal court, seeking to vindicate “institutional injuries,” that is, claims of
harm to their constitutional powers or duties. For example, the House of
Representatives sued the federal executive, alleging that the executive’s
(improper) implementation of the Affordable Care Act injured its Article I
legislative power.1 Along the same lines, the House claimed a “concrete,
particularized institutional injury” when a lower court struck down a federal
1

See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57-58 (D.D.C. 2015).
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law (the Defense of Marriage Act) on equal protection grounds.2 And the
Arizona state legislature went to court to protect its alleged federal
constitutional right to regulate federal elections.3
A growing number of scholars have endorsed these lawsuits.4 They insist,
to varying degrees, that government institutions should have standing to
protect their official powers and duties.5 Scholars argue, for example, that the
2 Brief on Jurisdiction for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House
of Representatives at 13, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12–307) [hereinafter
BLAG Brief] (arguing that the lower court decision caused “institutional harm to the House’s core
constitutional authority”).
3 See Brief for Appellant at 11, Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652 (2007) (No. 13-1314) [hereinafter Ariz. Leg. Brief] (urging that a state legislature should have
standing “when deprived of rights or powers conferred or protected by the federal Constitution.”);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”).
4 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124, 128
(2014) (suggesting courts should “grant institutional standing to public organs” to resolve disputes over
constitutional rules); Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 27-28
(2016) (advocating legislative standing to vindicate an “institutional injury”); Bradford C. Mank, Does a
House of Congress Have Standing over Appropriations?: The House of Representatives Challenges the Affordable
Care Act, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 141, 144 (2016) (“argu[ing] in favor of institutional congressional standing
by Congress, a house of Congress, or a duly authorized committee”); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional
Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 343-44 (2015) (arguing for congressional standing
to sue the executive branch in various settings); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution,
99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1440 n.16, 1514-15 (2013) (arguing that only institutions, rather than private parties,
should presumptively have standing to assert institutional interests); Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional
Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress in U.S. Constitutional Democracy, 93 IND. L.J. 845, 873-85,
893 (2018) (offering qualified support for some claims of institutional injury and urging that “[b]right
line preclusive rules categorically denying standing for broad ranges of plaintiffs or claims are neither
necessary nor desirable”); infra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
5 See sources cited supra note 4; infra notes 6–9 and accompanying text. Many earlier
commentators also advocated “institutional standing,” particularly for the federal legislature. See R.
Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose Vote Is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 2, 26-27, 31 (1986) (arguing that although courts should not grant standing to individual
legislators, “absent direct, personal injury,” courts should often permit Congress or a house of
Congress to assert “an institutional injury”); Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New
Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 264 (1981) (urging courts to dismiss at least some claims by individual
or groups of legislators, but to hear suits brought by (or on behalf of) a chamber or Congress as a
whole); Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers: Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve as Counterweight?, 54 U.
PITT. L. REV. 63, 70-71 (1992) (urging standing for both individual legislators and the institution as
a whole “when the executive usurps or undermines power constitutionally allocated to Congress”);
see also Theodore Y. Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs and Legislative Standing, 25 GA. L. REV.
227, 234-35, 321-22, 340-41 (1991) (arguing that the judiciary should hear only “ripe” cases—that is,
“when Congress as a whole,” or at least the minimum number of legislators necessary to effect legal
change, “asked for the court’s assistance”). There are a few skeptics. Two commentators doubt that
courts will accept most legislative standing claims. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to)
Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 685, 691-93 (2016); Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of
Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 58 (2015) (concluding that “the Court has avoided
recognizing legislative standing but has left the door very slightly ajar in the event that an
unanticipated case arises.”). And one article argues that legislative standing to assert “institutional
injuries” is not consistent with the separation of powers but fails to develop the analysis. See Anthony
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Senate may sue to vindicate its power to ratify treaties;6 that the House may
protect its role in originating revenue bills;7 and that the President may
prevent invasion of his Article II prerogatives.8 Many commentators further
insist that each house of Congress suffers an “institutional injury” and may
bring suit whenever the executive branch refuses to enforce a federal law.9
The federal courts have recently warmed up to these lawsuits as well. In
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the
Supreme Court upheld the state legislature’s standing to vindicate its
institutional interest in regulating federal elections.10 Likewise, in U.S. House
of Representatives v. Burwell, a federal district court found that the executive
Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court: The Past, Present, and Future of
Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 277, 280 n.354 (2001) (failing to specify the
“separation of powers” problem).
6 Indeed, commentators have urged that only thirty-four senators need to bring suit, because that is
the number—one third of the Senate plus one—that could prevent ratification. See Nash, supra note 4, at
378-79; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]”).
7 See Greene, supra note 4, at 148 (“[E]xamples of potential disputes over constitutional rules
might include . . . a House minority’s claim that an enrolled revenue bill did not ‘originate’ in the
House of Representatives . . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1 (“All Bills for raising Revenue
shall originate in the House of Representatives”).
8 See Huq, supra note 4, at 1514 (“Congress or the executive, that is, can and do sue to protect
Article I or Article II prerogatives.”); see also Greene, supra note 4, at 142, 149 (“Institutional standing
could apply to Houses of Congress, the President, an administrative agency, or a state entity.”).
9 Supporters of institutional standing are divided on this point. Compare, e.g., Enforcing the
President’s Constitutional Duty to Faithfully Execute the Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 61, 61 (2014) (statement of Elizabeth Price Foley, Professor of Law, Florida
International University College of Law) [hereinafter Foley Testimony, Hearing] (arguing that a
house of Congress suffers a cognizable “institutional injury” when the President fails to enforce a
law); Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 596-97, 603 (2017) (same);
Abner S. Greene, Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-butNot-Defend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 582, 598 (2012) (same); Michael Sant’Ambrogio,
Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1253, 1258-60 (2017) (arguing that Congress has
standing only when the executive “refuses to enforce a statutory provision based on constitutional
objections.”), with, e.g., Greene, supra note 4, at 128, 149-50 (arguing that lawmakers may sue over
violations of constitutional rules, but not standards like the President’s alleged failure to faithfully
execute the law); Hall, supra note 4, at 39-40 (urging that a claim that the President “fail[ed] to
enforce the law” does not assert a “cognizable institutional injury under any plausible understanding
of legislative standing doctrine”); Mank, supra note 4, at 144 (arguing “against legislative suits merely
challenging how the executive branch implements a particular federal statute.”). For a thoughtful
analysis, see John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J.L. & POL.
103, 104-05 (2015) (“[F]ederal legislators or legislative chambers [may not] sue executive officials to
compel them properly to execute the law, with no claim other than executive failure to do so.”).
10 See 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 2664 (2015) (“The Arizona Legislature . . . is an institutional
plaintiff asserting an institutional injury”). Although the majority in United States v. Windsor did not
address the House’s standing to defend the Defense of Marriage Act, see 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013)
(“[T]he Court need not decide whether BLAG would have standing . . . .”), Justice Alito insisted
that the House suffered an institutional injury, because the lower court decision striking down the
law “limited Congress’ power to legislate.” Id. at 2712-14 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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branch’s alleged misuse of federal funds caused an “institutional injury” to
the House.11 Significantly, jurists and scholars acknowledge that private
parties could not bring these lawsuits, simply alleging a violation of the
structural Constitution; such a private lawsuit would be dismissed as
presenting only a “generalized grievance.” But commentators assume that
government institutions are different, because they have a special—
“particularized”—interest in their constitutional powers.
This Article challenges that assumption. The concept of “institutional
injury” rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of our constitutional
scheme. The provisions of our structural Constitution are not designed for
the benefit of institutions. Instead, the Constitution divides power between
the federal government and the States and among the branches of the federal
government for the benefit of the entire public. The goal is to create a
workable, but limited, federal government that will not arbitrarily infringe
on individual liberty. Institutions are the vessels through which these
constitutional powers and duties flow; they are not the beneficiaries of this
scheme. Instead, any breakdown in this structural scheme is an injury to
everyone. Institutions have no greater interest in their constitutional powers
and duties than any other member of society.
Government standing to assert institutional injuries is not only at odds
with the constitutional structure but also undermined by history and
precedent. Although governments are in some ways special litigants, who can
bring suit even when private parties cannot, such special standing is limited
to certain classes of cases. In this Article, I articulate a theory that unites these
cases—and thereby provides a limiting principle for future government
standing claims. Governments have traditionally had broad standing only to
perform functions that they cannot perform without resort to the federal
courts. As the judiciary has long recognized, a government must have standing
when it seeks to impose sanctions on individuals; due process principles
require judicial review in such cases. This principle explains why federal and
state governments have standing to enforce and defend their respective laws,
11 See 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57-58, 71 n.21 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding the House of Representatives
had standing to pursue an institutional injury). As this Article went to print, there were a few
developments. First, the Supreme Court held that the Virginia House of Delegates lacked standing
to defend a state redistricting plan but reaffirmed the decision in Arizona State Legislature. See Va.
House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953-54, 1956 (2019). Second, a federal district
court held that the U.S. House of Representatives lacked standing to challenge President Trump’s
use of funds to build a wall along the southern border. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin
at *4-5, *12, 2019 WL 2343015 (D.D.C. June 3, 2019) (rejecting the asserted “institutional injury”).
The House plans to appeal that decision. See Jacqueline Thomsen, House Democrats Appeal Order
Against them in Trump Border Wall Lawsuit, THE HILL (June 10, 2019),
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/447794-house-dems-appeal-order-against-them-intrump-border-wall-lawsuit.

616

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 611

and why each house of Congress has traditionally been permitted to defend
its contempt sanctions against nonmembers. By contrast, under our
constitutional structure, government institutions can interact with one
another—and in the process enforce the structural Constitution—without the
involvement of an Article III court.12
Articulating a limiting principle on government standing furthers important
constitutional values. A prohibition on “institutional injuries” serves as a
reminder that individuals, not government institutions, are the rightsholders in
our constitutional scheme. Moreover, this restriction on government standing
also preserves important limits on the federal judicial power. Standing doctrine
is designed in part to identify when litigants have an interest that merits judicial
resolution, while leaving other matters to the political process. Governments
must go through the Article III courts—and therefore must have standing—
when they seek to act on individuals. But government institutions can and
should battle one another on their own (political) turf.
This analysis has significant implications for both legal scholarship and
constitutional litigation. First, the Article offers an important (and largely
overlooked) objection to standing based on “institutional injuries.”
Government institutions have no special interest in their constitutional
powers or duties. Second, the Article articulates a principled constraint on
government standing, a still undertheorized concept.13 Governments have
broad standing only to perform functions that they cannot perform, without
resort to an Article III court. This principle not only explains the
longstanding doctrine and history supporting government standing in
12 See Section II.A-B. This theory explains the boundaries of government standing in the bulk
of cases brought by governments. Government entities have broad standing to enforce and defend
the law against private parties, but government institutions lack standing to sue one another over
alleged violations of the structural Constitution. As noted below, there are complex questions about
the extent to which the state and federal governments can sue one another. I have dealt with state
standing in past work, and plan to address the (difficult) questions about federal government
standing to sue a State in future work. See infra note 132.
13 Scholars and jurists have only begun to consider the topic—likely in large part because
government-initiated lawsuits (outside the enforcement, defense, and contempt arenas) are a
relatively recent phenomenon. My past work discussed some aspects of government standing but
did not examine “institutional injury,” nor did it articulate a limiting principle for government
standing. See Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 627-28 (2014) (asserting that the House and the Senate may not defend
federal law on behalf of the United States); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U.
PA. L. REV. 1311, 1314-16 (2014) (arguing that Article II and Article I help define executive and
legislative standing to represent the United States); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the
United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 854-56 (2016) (discussing state standing). Notably, the
analysis here—emphasizing the distinctive nature of government standing—aligns with Richard
Fallon’s insightful observation that standing may be best understood not as a single unified doctrine,
but as a series of guidelines for different contexts. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of
Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1068-70 (2015).
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enforcement, defense, and contempt actions but also illuminates why there is
no similar history of standing to assert institutional harm.
Two points of clarification are necessary at the outset. First, the analysis here
focuses on what I refer to as special government standing—that is, cases where
governments assert injuries that private parties cannot (like the generalized interest
in enforcing the law). Governments may, like private parties, also suffer concrete
injuries-in-fact if, for example, someone breaches a contract with the government
or trespasses on government-owned land.14 There appears to be no question that
governments have standing in such cases.15 This Article explores the more difficult
question of when, and the extent to which, governments may invoke federal
jurisdiction, even though a private party could not.
Second, I acknowledge that the standing limitations on private parties
have themselves been subject to severe scholarly criticism.16 Many
commentators argue that Congress should have broad power to confer
standing on private individuals, including to assert some generalized
grievances.17 This Article does not take on that debate. For present purposes,
14 See, e.g., United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding the
government may prosecute trespassers in the same manner as ordinary landowners); see also Henry
P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing that,
even absent statutory authority, “the Executive has standing to enforce the contract or property
rights of the United States”).
15 Such concrete injuries may allow governments to assert some structural constitutional
claims—as is true of private parties. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205-06, 211-12
(1987) (upholding, against a Spending Clause challenge, a federal law that required States to raise
the minimum drinking age to twenty-one, or risk losing federal highway funds); Grove, When Can
a State Sue the United States?, supra note 13, at 867-69 (explaining that although the Dole Court did
not mention standing, the State had a concrete pecuniary interest in the federal funds). For similar
reasons, States and localities may challenge federal laws that regulate their workplaces, cf. Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment
challenge to a federal minimum wage law, without discussing standing), and “sanctuary cities” should
have standing to challenge a federal executive decision to withhold funds on the (asserted) ground
that the cities declined to abide by federal immigration law. Cf. Vivian Yee, California Sues Justice
Dept. over Funding for Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES, at A9 (Aug. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/us/california-sues-trump-administration-over-sanctuary-citypolicy.html [https://perma.cc/HWJ3-RMFR] (discussing lawsuits).
16 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE 93-114 (2017); Evan Caminker, The
Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 381 (1989) (“[M]odern standing doctrine lacks
a coherent conceptual foundation.”); Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV.
459, 460-64 (2008) (doubting that standing protects separation of powers concerns).
17 See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, ‘Injuries,’ and Article III,
91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 235 (1992) (“Congress can create standing as it chooses and, in general, can
deny standing when it likes.”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public
Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 54 (1984) (suggesting that
courts should generally not “hold[] unconstitutional an act of Congress” conferring standing on
private plaintiffs); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223-24 (1988)
(arguing that Congress should have “essentially unlimited power” to grant standing to enforce
federal statutes but only limited power as to constitutional rights).
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I assume that the Supreme Court will continue to demand that private parties
demonstrate a concrete injury to sue in federal court. My goal is to show that,
whatever the proper boundaries of private party standing, government
institutions should have no special status to sue over violations of the
structural Constitution.18
The analysis proceeds as follows. Part I argues that the concept of
“institutional injury” is at odds with the constitutional structure. In our
constitutional scheme, government institutions have no special interest in
their official powers or duties. Part II asserts that structure, history, and
precedent place important limits on government standing and further
undermine the case for institutional standing. That Part also offers a novel
interpretation of Coleman v. Miller, a case involving the standing of state
legislators that has long puzzled commentators.19 Finally, Part III underscores
that denying institutional standing furthers important normative values.
Such a restriction not only preserves limitations on the federal judicial power
but also reminds us of the purposes of our constitutional scheme. The
constitutional structure was not designed for the benefit of government
institutions, but to serve “we the people.”20
I. THE STRUCTURAL CASE AGAINST “INSTITUTIONAL INJURY”
The structural Constitution is, and was always designed to be, a means to
an end. The constitutional scheme has two primary (and somewhat
conflicting) purposes. One goal was to correct for the defects in the Articles
of Confederation by creating a more powerful—and thus more effective—

18 Relatedly, this Article does not dispute that private and public institutions may suffer some
judicially cognizable injuries. Corporations and non-profits often have standing to sue in federal
court; in many cases, standing questions do not even arise. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017) (nonprofit church alleged that the denial of a
state grant to purchase playground equipment violated the Free Exercise Clause); South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84-87 (1984) (allowing a corporation to challenge a
state law on Dormant Commerce Clause grounds). Governments can also bring suit if they suffer
concrete injuries (or if they assert certain sovereign interests, such as the interest in enforcing the
law). See infra Section II.A; supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. My goal is to show that
government institutions should not have special standing to assert an “injury” to their constitutional
powers and duties. Government entities have no greater interest in the structural Constitution than
any other member of society—and thus suffer no “particularized” injury when their constitutional
powers and duties are threatened.
19 See 307 U.S. 433 (1939); infra Section II.C.
20 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution . . . .”).
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central government to serve the public.21 But second, the Constitution also
had to control the very government that it created and empowered, so as to
prevent arbitrary infringement on individual liberty.22 The Madisonian
scheme of separated powers and federalism was the mechanism chosen to
achieve this difficult balance.23
Notably, many scholars have recently criticized the Madisonian design, arguing
that the original structure has largely collapsed or failed.24 Whatever one thinks of
this commentary, for my purposes, the important point is that even the sharpest
critics agree that the structural Constitution is a means to an end. The skeptics
simply believe that the Madisonian design has failed to serve its primary ends.
I begin with an overview of these basic structural principles, because they
underscore a point that is central to this Article: the Constitution confers
power on and divides power among institutions, not for the benefit of those
institutions, but to serve the public at large. Government institutions suffer
no particularized injury when their powers or duties are threatened and,
accordingly, should not have standing to assert “institutional injuries.”
A. The Constitutional Structure as a Means, Not as an End
1. The Madisonian Ideal
Many features of our structural Constitution reflect its dual purposes to
create an effective, but limited, government. Indeed, the entire scheme of
separated powers can be seen in this way. The Constitution divides
responsibility over the enactment, execution, and adjudication of the law
among three different institutions, so that each branch can specialize in one

21 Alexander Hamilton laid out this purpose in the very first paper of The Federalist. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (underscoring the
“unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting federal government” under the Articles
of Confederation); SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 4-10 (2003) (concluding that the Constitution was designed not only to
constrain power but also to devise a workable government).
22 See infra notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
23 Notably, one need not adopt an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation to
accept that the structural Constitution has these dual purposes. Even strong critics of originalism
agree that the Constitution was designed to create a workable, but limited, government. See infra
Section I.A. My goal is to show that, once we are reminded about these overarching (and largely
uncontested) principles, the case for institutional standing is greatly weakened.
24 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER
THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 18 (2010) (asserting that the Madisonian “theory has collapsed”);
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 657, 671 (2011) (“[A]ll indications are that political ‘ambition counteracting ambition’ has
failed to serve as a self-enforcing safeguard for the constitutional structures of federalism and
separation of powers in the way that Madison seems to have envisioned.”).
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aspect of governance and thereby (in theory) operate more efficiently.25 But
this division can also (again, in theory) protect individual liberty by
preventing the concentration of power in any one person or institution.26 As
James Madison emphasized in The Federalist, if the legislative, executive, and
judicial powers were joined “in the same hands, . . . the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control.”27
More specific provisions also reflect the dual purposes of the constitutional
scheme. For example, Article I gives Congress far greater power than that
exercised by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation
(among other things, to regulate interstate commerce and tax the populace).28
But Congress can exercise these powers only through the cumbersome process
of bicameralism and presentment.29 Every law thus requires the assent of the
House, the Senate, and the President (or two-thirds of each house to override
a presidential veto).30 Although this procedure may lead to better
policymaking overall, because it ensures that the exercise of legislative power
is carried out only after careful deliberation, it also creates multiple “veto
gates” for legislation–allowing any proposal to be stopped by the House, the
Senate, or the President.31 Along the same lines, the Constitution facilitates
international arrangements by empowering the President to negotiate

25 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“By allocating specific powers and
responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both
effective and accountable.”); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 64
(2005) (“Separation of powers . . . facilitated a certain degree of specialization of labor, enabling each
branch to concentrate on a different function and thereby operate more efficiently.”).
26 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The doctrine of
the separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote efficiency but to
preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.”); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980) (“[T]he separation of powers principle was perceived from
the time of its origin as a keystone for guaranteeing the liberty of the people.”); MARTIN H. REDISH,
THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 103 (1995) (emphasizing that the separation of
powers was “to prevent absolutism—the arbitrary use of power”); John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617, 682
(1996) (underscoring “the separation of powers objective of preserving liberty by dispersing
government authority”); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 237-38 (rev. ed. 2014) (“[T]he most obvious way [the original Constitution
would protect liberties] was by the political constraints of federalism and separation of powers.”).
27 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 301, 303 (James Madison) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
30 Id.
31 See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 233-36
(1962); Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1339 (2001)
(noting that this process creates, in effect, a supermajority requirement); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger
G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80
GEO. L.J. 705, 707 n.5 (1992) (emphasizing the “veto gates” of the federal legislative process).
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treaties.32 (Notably, under the Articles of Confederation, there was no central
executive to engage in such diplomacy.)33 But the document places an
important check on this presidential power by permitting just over one-third
of the Senate to block any such international accord.34
The States are another important layer in the scheme of checks and
balances.35 Although most commentary focuses on the role of the state
government as a whole, the U.S. Constitution also–important to the analysis
here–confers certain powers on specific state institutions. These provisions
further reflect the Constitution’s dual purposes of creating a workable, but
constrained, government to serve the public. Article V, for example, provides
that constitutional amendments can be ratified by three-fourths of state
legislatures.36 Notably, this amendment procedure is much more flexible than
the unanimity requirement of the Articles of Confederation.37 But Article V
still ensures that changes can be blocked by a little over one-fourth of the States.
Under the Madisonian design, this interlocking web of powers and duties
would simultaneously ensure a workable government to meet the needs of
“we the people,” while preventing arbitrary exercises of power that might
threaten our liberties. The officials in each institution would have not only
the proper incentives to serve the public interest but also “the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments” on
constitutional principles.38 As Madison famously stated, “[a]mbition” would
“counteract ambition.”39 Ideally, this regime would work so well that the U.S.
Constitution would be “a machine that would go of itself.”40
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See ARTICLES OF CONFED. of 1781, art. IX (giving the Continental Congress authority over
foreign affairs, including a limited power to “enter[] into treaties and alliances”); CHARLES C.
THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1789 55–56 (1969) (noting how the
Continental Congress had to exercise this power even before the Articles went into effect in 1781).
34 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]wo thirds of the Senators present [must] concur”).
35 Under the Madisonian design, the States and the national government would compete for the
public’s affection and, in the process, notify the public of constitutional violations by the other level of
government. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 323 (James Madison). Federalism, of
course, is said to offer several benefits in addition to protecting liberty—providing, for example,
regulatory diversity and additional opportunities for political participation. Those benefits also focus
on individuals, so I do not separately emphasize them here. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458
(1991) (“[The] federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages.”).
36 U.S. CONST. art. V.
37 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. XIII (establishing that “every State” must
agree to “any alteration”).
38 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 321-22 (James Madison); see Jack Goldsmith &
Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1791, 1832 (2009) (“Madison hoped that [the Constitution] could be made politically self-enforcing
by aligning the political interests of officials and constituents with constitutional rights and rules.”).
39 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 322 (James Madison).
40 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF 18 (1986).
32
33
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2. Recent Critiques Question the Means, Not the Ends
In recent years, the Madisonian “machine” has been subjected to a barrage
of scholarly criticism. Notably, commentators do not doubt that the
Madisonian scheme was designed to create an effective, but limited,
government to serve the public. Even the sharpest skeptics acknowledge that
“[m]utual checking and monitoring by the branches of government” was
supposed to “prevent concentration of power, suppress the evils of factionalism,
and conduce to better policymaking overall,”41 while also protecting “individual
liberty and minority interests.”42 But scholars doubt that the scheme of
separated powers and federalism can fulfill these lofty goals.
There are two major objections. First, scholars assert that the scheme of
separated powers and federalism can no longer serve as a reliable check on
concentrated power—or, at least, cannot check power in the way Madison
envisioned. In an influential article, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes argue
that Congress will check the President only when the House of
Representatives or the Senate is controlled by a different political party.43 By
contrast, when the government is unified, the two branches are more likely
to cooperate than to compete.44 Along similar lines, Jessica Bulman-Pozen has
urged that state officials will challenge federal action only when the federal
government is controlled by an opposing political party.45 That is, “[s]tates
oppose federal policy” for partisan reasons, “not because they are states as
such.”46 In sum, according to this critique, any check on the concentration of
power depends on the “separation of parties, not powers.”47
41 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 18; see id. (arguing that “[t]his theory has
collapsed”); see also BINDER, supra note 21, at 4-10 (emphasizing that the Constitution was designed
not only to constrain power but also to devise a workable government).
42 Levinson, supra note 24, at 668.
43 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2311, 2316, 2329 (2006).
44 Id. at 2329 (“[W]hen government is unified . . . we should expect interbranch competition
to dissipate.”); accord Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1809-10
n.222 (2007) (agreeing that “the branches operate very differently depending on whether they are
all controlled by the same party”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:
Party Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 479 (2008) (“Lawmakers
advance party interests, not Congress’s institutional interests, such that relations between Congress
and the White House are defined by whether there is unified or divided government.”).
45 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1079-80 (2014)
(arguing that States serve as “checks” on the federal government when the States are “governed by
individuals who affiliate with a different political party”).
46 Id. at 1080.
47 Levinson & Pildes, supra note 43, at 2385. Notably, even if this “separation of parties” theory is
correct, the presence of state governments helps ensure that there will be some checking. It would be
exceedingly difficult for a single party to gain control at both the state and the federal levels. See Daryl
J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term—Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV.
31, 109-10 (2016) (“[F]ederalism all but ensures the vertical division of government along partisan lines.”).
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Second, commentators also worry that our constitutional scheme contains far
too many checks on federal government action, such that the Madisonian scheme
has failed to create a workable government. Significantly, under the Madisonian
design, the legislature should be the heart of policymaking; that way, all major
policies can be carefully tested and deliberated through the complex process of
bicameralism and presentment.48 Yet complaints of congressional gridlock
abound.49 Even during periods of unified government, internal rules (like the
veto power of committees and the Senate filibuster), as well as internal party
divides, may make it difficult for Congress to enact legislation.50
Although these two criticisms may appear to be in tension (that is, how
can the government be both gridlocked and insufficiently constrained?), there
is an important connection. Bruce Ackerman and others argue that when
government is gridlocked, such that Congress cannot act, the President fills
the void through unilateral action.51 This “solution” may temporarily provide
the public with needed services. But it also creates the risk of concentrated
power—in Ackerman’s terms, a “runaway presidency”—the very disease that
the structural checks and balances aim to avoid.52
Given these concerns, scholars increasingly suggest fixes–alternative ways
to achieve the aims of the Madisonian design. Much of the commentary
focuses on how to constrain the growth in presidential power. Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule argue that although the Madisonian scheme has collapsed,
politics and public opinion have largely filled the void and today place
important limits on what the President can do.53 Neal Katyal has emphasized
that the executive branch contains its own “internal separation of powers.”54
48 See supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 322
(James Madison) (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.”).
49 See BINDER, supra note 21, at 1-2 (observing that “innumerable critics of American politics”
complain about gridlock and “call for more responsive and effective government”); see also Daryl J.
Levinson, Incapacitating the State, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 181, 208-09 (2014) (“The inefficiency
and gridlock of divided government . . . is now more than ever a source of frustration for those who
seek governmental solutions to pressing social problems.”).
50 House and Senate committees may block even popular legislation. See John R. Boyce &
Diane P. Bischak, The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
1, 1-3 (2002). The Senate’s Rule 22 allows one member to filibuster a bill, absent a cloture vote by
three-fifths of the Senate (sixty members). See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH,
POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? 8 (1997).
51 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 4-6 (2010)
(arguing that frustration with “congressional obstructionism” creates “the danger of a runaway
presidency”); see also Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 1097, 1100-01 (“[C]ongressional gridlock pushes the other branches to take a more pronounced role”).
52 ACKERMAN, supra note 51, at 6.
53 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 24, at 4-5, 18; id. at 12-13 (constraints include
elections, public approval ratings, and presidential concerns about long-term legacy).
54 See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317-18 (2006) (“outlin[ing] a set of mechanisms that create checks
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Under this view, the complex bureaucracy—replete with government officials
who serve from administration to administration—can push back on
“presidential adventurism.”55 And Jack Goldsmith and Gillian Metzger have
argued that the President is constrained by a variety of forces, including the
other branches, the bureaucracy, and external groups like the press, lawyers,
and nonprofit organizations.56 This mix of legal and political oversight,
Goldsmith asserts, “translates in a rough way the framers’ original design of
making presidential action accountable . . . to the wishes of the people.”57
Whatever one thinks of these critiques (or the suggested fixes),58 they do
provide important reminders about the nature of our structural scheme of
separated powers and federalism. The scheme is simply a means to an end. As
Jacob Gersen has observed, the Madisonian structure was “a design choice,”
one way to achieve “the dominant aspiration[s] of constitutionalism . . . to
constrain government, avoid tyranny, and produce desirable public policy.”59
This point sheds light on how we should conceptualize the various powers
conferred on, and duties assigned to, the different branches and levels of
government. Government institutions are simply the vessels through which
constitutional powers and duties flow. Ideally, the interaction among these
institutions will lead to good policymaking while preserving individual
liberty. But regardless, institutions are not the beneficiaries of their respective
powers. Government institutions have no greater interest in their
constitutional powers and duties than any other member of society.

and balances within the executive branch” and that rely on the bureaucracy to “constrain presidential
adventurism”); see also Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 515, 543, 543-47 (2015) (emphasizing that “the independent and much relied-upon civil service
has institutional, cultural, and legal incentives to insist that agency leaders follow the law, embrace
prevailing scientific understandings, and refrain from partisan excesses”).
55 Katyal, supra note 54, at 2318.
56 See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT x-xvi, 209 (2012) (arguing that these
forces not only constrain the President but have also legitimated the growth in presidential power);
Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 77-85 (2017) (arguing that “the internal complexity of the
administrative state” checks executive power and is essential to maintain the separation of powers).
57 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 56, at 209.
58 Some scholarship has questioned the premises of the “separation of parties” critique. See
JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 28-35 (2017) (urging that each house of Congress
does at times protect its institutional interests and further arguing that cooperation during periods
of unified government “is a feature of the American governing system, not a bug,” if it reflects the
wishes of the public); David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (2018) (arguing that “the behavior of federal officials cannot always be explained
simply by partisan or ideological motives”).
59 Jacob E. Gersen, Unbundled Powers, 96 VA. L. REV. 301, 302-03 (2010); see also id. at 332
(arguing that “systems can [also] control the excessive concentration of power . . . by limiting the
domain in which a political institution may act”).
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B. Anthropomorphizing Government Institutions
Given the structural principles that I have articulated, it may seem surprising
that jurists and scholars are so enthusiastic about government standing to assert
institutional injuries. But the support for institutional standing appears to be an
outgrowth of a trend in separation of powers and federalism case law. The Supreme
Court’s structural constitutional jurisprudence is riddled with “institution talk.”
That is, the Justices rarely revert to first principles, such as the protection of liberty
or the promotion of a workable government. Instead, the Supreme Court typically
examines separation of powers and federalism cases as “turf wars” between
institutions or levels of government.
Several commentators have powerfully criticized the Court’s emphasis on
institutions rather than background principles. For my purposes, however, it is
important to acknowledge that there is nothing inherently wrong with this
“institution talk.” As I explain below, such an approach may be a legitimate way
to create workable doctrine. But such “talk” becomes problematic when
commentators take the additional step of assuming that institutions have
ownership over—and even rights to—their constitutional powers. That
additional and troubling step has been taken by supporters of institutional
standing.
1. A Doctrinal Short Cut
The Supreme Court has often observed that the ultimate purpose of the
scheme of separated powers and federalism is to protect individual liberty.60 The
Justices have also, albeit less commonly, stated that the Founding Fathers sought
to create an effective national government.61 However, these first-order
principles rarely factor into the Court’s analysis in structural constitutional cases.
Instead, in any given separation of powers case, the Supreme Court generally
asks whether one branch has “encroached” on another branch or otherwise
“aggrandized” its own powers.62 For example, in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court

60 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (“State sovereignty is not just
an end in itself: Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (“The ultimate purpose of [the]
separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.”).
61 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“Deterrence of arbitrary or tyrannical
rule is not the sole reason for dispersing the federal power . . . . By allocating specific powers and
responsibilities to a branch fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is
both effective and accountable.”).
62 E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (“[T]he system of separated powers and
checks and balances . . . was regarded by the Framers as ‘a self-executing safeguard against the
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.’” (quoting Buckley v.
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struck down a federal passport law as a violation of the President’s power to
recognize foreign governments.63 The Court declared: “It was an improper act
for Congress to ‘aggrandiz[e] its power at the expense of another branch.’”64
Likewise, in federalism cases, the Court does not typically harken back to
first-order principles of liberty but instead aims to prevent incursions by the
national government on the States qua States.65 For example, in its decisions
holding that Congress may not “commandeer” state institutions, the Court
has admonished that Congress may not “reduc[e] [the States] to puppets of a
ventriloquist Congress.”66 Moreover, in its state sovereign immunity
decisions, the Court has emphasized the importance of state dignity,
declaring that “[w]hen Congress legislates in matters affecting the States,” it
must accord these “sovereign entities . . . the esteem due to them as joint
participants in a federal system.”67
A number of scholars have sharply criticized the Court’s focus on
government institutions, rather than background principles. As Rebecca
Brown has emphasized, the Court’s separation of powers opinions “place
primary emphasis not on the prevention of tyranny or protection of
individual liberties, but on the advancement of the institutional interests of
the branches themselves, as if that goal were itself a good—a proposition with
no historical support.”68 Likewise, in the federalism literature, many

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976)); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (“The dangers of
congressional usurpation of Executive Branch functions have long been recognized.”).
63 The statutory provision at issue instructed the executive to allow individuals born in
Jerusalem to designate “Israel” as the official birthplace on their passports. The Court reasoned that
the law interfered with the President’s decision not to recognize Jerusalem as part of any country.
See 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2082, 2094-96 (2015).
64 Id. at 2096 (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).
65 Notably, the Court often focuses on the State as an aggregate. But some doctrines, such as
commandeering, do emphasize infringement on specific state institutions. See New York, 505 U.S. at
161 (“Congress may not simply ‘commandeer[] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program’”(internal citation omitted));
infra note 66 and accompanying text.
66 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id.
at 933-35 (holding that a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act improperly
commandeered state officials to enforce federal law).
67 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 758 (1999); see also Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S. C. State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to
accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”).
68 Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1518-19
(1991) (“The Court’s ultimate goal appears to be to protect the interests of each branch—its ‘turf ’—
against encroachment by the others.”); accord David A. Strauss, Article III Courts and the Constitutional
Structure, 65 IND. L.J. 307, 309-10 (1990) (lamenting this “troubling tendency in separation of powers
law”); see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 115 (1994) (describing the Court’s case law as “a kind of ‘turf protection’ model of the
Constitution”); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U.
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commentators have attacked “the Court’s apparent anthropomorphization of
states.”69 In both contexts, structural constitutional doctrine focuses on
protecting the “turf ” of the “victim” branch or level of government, rather
than securing the broader purposes of the constitutional scheme.70
Accordingly, some scholars urge the Court to return to first principles,
arguing that the “protection of individual rights . . . should be an explicit
factor” in structural constitutional cases.71
These scholars have raised important concerns. As Brown observes, there
is “no historical support” for the idea that our Constitution advances “the
institutional interests of [government entities] themselves.”72 Indeed, that
point is central to this Article’s case against institutional standing.
Nevertheless, I want to acknowledge that the “anthropomorphization” that
these commentators have identified is not necessarily objectionable. That is,
there are legitimate reasons for the Court, in its separation of powers and
federalism cases, to talk about institutions instead of background principles.
In articulating constitutional doctrine, the Supreme Court cannot always
harken back to first principles. Instead, it must often craft second-order rules that
implement the more generalized commands of the Constitution.73 Indeed, this
PA. L. REV. 603, 629 (2001) (“Discussions of the need to prevent aggrandizement or to preserve
balance among the departments assume that balance among the three branches is an end in itself.”).
69 Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 81, 84-86, 89-91 (2001) (exploring, and ultimately rejecting, both expressive and instrumental
justifications for the focus on state “dignity”); accord Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The
Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 246, 250-51 (2000) (arguing that the Court’s
“insistence on ‘dignity’ for the states sounds like . . . blind deference to States Rights,” rather than an
emphasis on the background principles that federalism is designed to serve); Suzanna Sherry, States Are
People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1125-27 (2000) (criticizing the way the Court has
“anthropomorphized” States); Timothy Zick, Statehood as the New Personhood: The Discovery of
Fundamental “States’ Rights”, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 213, 224-26, 226-43, 343 (2004) (“[C]rucial
aspects of federalism, including institutional flexibility, national community, and ultimately even
individual liberty, will all be casualties of this new conception of ‘states’ rights.’”); see also Judith Resnik
& Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1924-28 (2003) (tracing the origins of the word “dignity” in international law
and Supreme Court jurisprudence and concluding that the Court is not wrong to refer to States’
“dignity,” but is wrong to interpret that dignity to imply immunity from suit).
70 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 68, at 1518-19 (noting this tendency in separation of powers cases);
Levinson, Foreword, supra note 47, at 44 (“In federalism cases, similarly, the fighting issue is typically
how much policymaking turf the national government will be permitted to control and how much
will be left for state governments.”).
71 Brown, supra note 68, at 1515-16; accord Strauss, supra note 68, at 309 (noting “the development
of what might be called a turf-protecting instead of an individual rights orientation.”). Victoria Nourse
has powerfully argued for more attention to how structural changes affect “political relationships”—
that is, the way in which individuals and groups are empowered through the political system. See
Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 751-52, 781-86 (1999).
72 Brown, supra note 68, at 1518.
73 Many scholars have recognized that the Supreme Court seeks in large part to craft doctrines
that implement the more generalized commands of the Constitution. See RICHARD H. FALLON,
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approach may be the only way that the Court can provide guidance to lower
courts.74 In our current judiciary, the Supreme Court reviews only a fraction of
lower court decisions on federal law. But the Justices can still influence their
judicial inferiors by articulating broad doctrinal tests for the lower courts to apply
in the many cases the Supreme Court cannot review.75 For example, the Court has
instructed lower courts to subject content-based restrictions on speech to strict
scrutiny,76 while applying only rational basis scrutiny to most economic
regulations.77 These doctrinal rules provide substantial guidance to lower courts
on how to approach a range of constitutional cases.
Similar principles may explain the Court’s “institution talk” in its
structural constitutional cases. Although scholars have been extremely
skeptical of the Madisonian design in recent years, these critiques do not (yet)
appear to have influenced the judiciary. Instead, the Justices seem committed
to the idea that “[l]iberty is always at stake,” when one branch encroaches on
JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 4-5 (2001) (“[T]he Justices . . . must craft doctrines and
tests that reflect judgments of constitutional meaning but are not perfectly determined by it.”);
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9, 12 (2004) (“Much of existing
constitutional doctrine is better understood not as judicial statements of constitutional meaning . . .
but rather as judicial directions regarding how courts should decide whether such operative
propositions have been satisfied . . . .”); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 190, 190 (1988) (“[C]onstitutional law consists, to a significant degree, in the
elaboration of doctrines that are universally accepted as legitimate . . . .”).
74 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5
(2009) (arguing that, given its capacity constraints, the modern Court should issue broad decisions
to guide lower courts on federal law). Without endorsing the approach as a normative matter, some
scholars have observed that the Court can and does use broad doctrinal rules to guide its judicial
inferiors. See Toby J. Heytens, Doctrine Formulation and Distrust, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2045,
2046-48 (2008); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668-69 (2012); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some
Implications of the Supreme Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093, 1095, 1135 (1987); see also Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political
Control, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 326, 326, 339 (2007) (asserting that legal doctrine can serve as an
“instrument of political control by higher courts over lower courts”).
75 This approach will be effective, of course, only if lower courts comply with Supreme Court
decisions. For purposes of this discussion, I assume that lower courts do endeavor to comply—an
assumption that has some empirical support. See John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law
of Libel: Compliance by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517-19 (1980) (finding compliance
with the Court’s libel decisions); Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in
Economic Policy Making in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830, 838-39 (1987) (finding
compliance with labor and antitrust decisions); see also David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta:
Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2025-26 (2013)
(concluding, based on an empirical study, that lower courts generally follow higher court dicta).
76 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are
presumptively invalid.”).
77 See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (showing the Court’s view that
social and economic regulations that neither interfere with fundamental constitutional rights nor
proceed along suspect lines should generally be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification”).
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another or the federal government intrudes on state terrain.78 If the Justices
are indeed convinced that the divisions among the branches and between the
federal and state governments are essential to protecting individuals, then all
the Court need do (and instruct lower courts to do) is preserve those
institutional boundaries. In this way, the Court’s “turf-protection” doctrines
(like aggrandizement and commandeering) can be understood as doctrinal
short cuts–second-order rules that implement the first-order ideals of
preserving a workable government, while also safeguarding individual liberty.
But it is crucial to recognize that the Court’s emphasis on institutions is,
properly understood, only a second-order rule to protect first-order principles.
That is, “institution talk” is nothing more than a doctrinal short cut. Supporters
of institutional standing seem to have overlooked this important point. These
jurists and scholars have recently begun to treat the “victim” institution not only
as the focus of analysis but as a special beneficiary of the constitutional scheme
(even a rightsholder). With this conceptual move, the “victim branch” becomes
an injured party with standing to sue in federal court.
2. The Troubling Move: Institutions as Constitutional Rightsholders
Every institutional standing case involves a claim that some provision of
the structural Constitution has been violated. Under current doctrine, if a
private plaintiff brought such a suit, the federal judiciary would toss it out of
court as presenting only a “generalized grievance” that “does not state an
Article III case or controversy.”79 To bring suit, a private party must
demonstrate a separate concrete injury-in-fact.80 Supporters of institutional
standing do not dispute this point. Accordingly, their argument for
“institutional injury” must rest on an assumption that government
institutions have a greater—more “particularized”—stake in structural
constitutional provisions than do private individuals.
Indeed, that is precisely what recent courts and commentators have
asserted. In U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, the House challenged the
executive’s implementation of the Affordable Care Act.81 The House alleged in
part that the executive branch had spent money, without a specific
congressional appropriation. The funds at issue were subsidies that the Obama
78 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also
supra note 60 and accompanying text.
79 See Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (per curiam) (“[A] plaintiff raising only a
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws . . . does not state an Article III case or
controversy.”) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992)).
80 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (holding that a private party must demonstrate
a concrete injury that can be traced to a challenged action and that can be redressed by the requested relief).
81 See 130 F.Supp.3d 53, 60-70 (D.D.C. 2015).
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administration provided to health insurance companies to offset the costs of
insuring low-income individuals.82 According to the House, the executive’s
conduct violated Article I, which states that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”83
The district court recognized that no private party would have standing
simply to assert that the federal executive misspent federal funds. But the
court insisted that the House of Representatives was different: “[B]ecause the
House occupies a unique role in the appropriations process prescribed by the
Constitution, not held by the ordinary citizen, perversion of that process
inflicts on the House a particular injury quite distinguishable from any
suffered by the public generally.”84 The House had standing to redress that
“concrete and particularized” injury in federal court.85
In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,
the state legislature brought suit to protect its institutional interest in
regulating federal elections.86 In 2000, voters in the State had, through the
initiative process, adopted a constitutional amendment that transferred
control over redistricting to an independent commission. (The goal was to
overcome partisan gerrymandering.)87 To support standing, the Arizona
legislature pointed to the Elections Clause, which provides that “[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof,” although
“Congress may at any time . . . alter such Regulations.”88
Notably, just eight years before, the Supreme Court in Lance v. Coffman
unanimously rejected private party standing to bring a virtually identical

See id. at 60.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see Burwell, 130 F.Supp.3d at 57, 81 (“Through this lawsuit, the
House of Representatives complains that [the executive has] spent billions of unappropriated dollars
to support the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.”).
84 Burwell, 130 F.Supp.3d at 72-73.
85 Id. at 76-77 (“[T]he House of Representatives has alleged an injury in fact under its NonAppropriation Theory—that is, an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and
particularized.”). The House also claimed that the executive infringed on its Article I power by
delaying enforcement of parts of the Affordable Care Act (and thereby “amending” the statute). Id.
at 63. Despite the House’s constitutional rhetoric, the district court construed this claim as an
assertion that the executive had violated the statute, rather than the Constitution. Id. at 57-58. On
this basis, the court denied standing. Id. at 76.
86 See 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59 (2015).
87 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, §1(14); Arizona State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2658-59 (noting that
the amendment was “an endeavor by Arizona voters to address the problem of partisan gerrymandering”).
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also Ariz. Leg. Brief, supra note 3, at 11 (“The divestment
of the Legislature’s constitutionally-conferred redistricting authority clearly constitutes an actual,
concrete, and particularized injury to the Legislature.”).
82
83
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constitutional claim.89 The Court in Lance declared: “The only injury
plaintiffs allege is that the law—specifically the Elections Clause—has not
been followed. This injury is precisely the kind of undifferentiated,
generalized grievance about the conduct of government that we have refused
to countenance in the past.”90 But in Arizona State Legislature, the Court found
standing, reasoning that the state initiative “strips the Legislature of its alleged
prerogative to initiate redistricting.”91 Accordingly, the state legislature could
sue to redress its “concrete and particularized” “institutional injury.”92
Likewise, a growing number of commentators insist that institutions have
particularized interests in their constitutional powers—interests not shared
by private parties.93 Jamal Greene, for example, applauds the grant of
standing in Arizona State Legislature, but he urges the Court to go much
further in accepting claims of institutional injury.94 To illustrate this broader
claim, Greene points to NLRB v. Noel Canning, which involved the Recess
Appointments Clause.95 The case before the Court was brought by a private
company (Noel Canning), which challenged an adverse decision by the
National Labor Relations Board on the ground that three Board members
were improper recess appointees.96
Greene argues that “Noel Canning involved . . . a pure public law dispute,
one in which the central interests on both sides of the case are those of public
institutions rather than private citizens.”97 The “central interests” in that case
were, on the one hand, “the right of the President to appoint the Board’s
members during a disputed recess of the Senate,”98 and, on the other hand, “the

89 See 549 U.S. 437, 441-42 (2007) (per curiam). In Lance, the plaintiffs claimed that the
Colorado Supreme Court had usurped the legislature’s authority over redistricting by allowing a
court-written plan to go into effect. See id. at 437-38.
90 See id. at 442 (stating that the problem with private party standing was “obvious”).
91 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663, 2665 (2015).
92 Id. at 2663-64; see also id. (“[t]he Arizona Legislature . . . is an institutional plaintiff asserting
an institutional injury”).
93 See supra notes 4–9 (collecting sources endorsing institutional standing).
94 See Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1645-46, 1696-97, 1699-1701
(2016) (construing the Court’s case law as prohibiting institutional standing and urging that “in cases
about the meaning of constitutional rules, the Court should have no special aversion to the standing
of political actors or institutions”).
95 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556-57, 2567 (2014); Greene, supra note 4, at 140-41.
96 See Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2557.
97 Greene, supra note 4, at 140.
98 See id. (“The Court’s real interest was not in the right of Noel Canning to a properly
constituted Board; it was in the right of the President to appoint the Board’s members during a
disputed recess of the Senate.”).
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Senate’s interest in presidential appointments that skirt advice and consent.”99
In such a case, Greene argues, the Court should not wait for a private party
with a concrete injury to bring suit. Instead, the Court should “[g]rant standing
to the Senate itself, or to a minority of the Senate” to vindicate “[t]he claimed
constitutional injury” to “its institutional prerogatives.”100
Supporters of institutional standing clearly treat government institutions
as the primary beneficiaries of their respective powers. Indeed, some jurists
and scholars suggest that institutions are constitutional rightsholders.
Greene, for example, emphasizes “the right of the President to [make
appointments] during a disputed recess of the Senate.”101 Aziz Huq agrees
that structural constitutional cases involve the “rights of institutions such as
states and branches.”102 And in Burwell, the district court declared that the
House “must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the
protection of [its] justiciable constitutional rights.”103
But this view has taken us far afield from the constitutional scheme.
Consider Greene’s arguments about Noel Canning. One can certainly debate
the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. But its underlying purpose (on
any interpretation) is to ensure that the President can keep the federal
government staffed during a “recess” of the Senate, without giving the
President untrammeled power over appointments.104 The Clause thus reflects
the dual purposes of the structural Constitution—providing an effective
99 See Greene, supra note 94, at 1699-1700 (arguing that the Court should grant standing “in
the presence of a strong institutional interest, such as the Senate’s interest in presidential
appointments that skirt advice and consent”).
100 See Greene, supra note 4, at 127 (“The claimed constitutional injury in this case was to the
Senate and its institutional prerogatives.”).
101 Greene, supra note 4, at 140.
102 For this reason, Huq characterizes private suits to enforce the structural Constitution as a
form of “third-party standing.” See Huq, supra note 4, at 1436-37, 1440-41, 1457-58 (arguing on this
basis that only institutions, rather than private parties, should presumptively have standing to
enforce the structural Constitution). See generally Section III.A.
103 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 79 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979)) (making this comment in concluding that the House
had an implied right of action under the Constitution).
104 Although the majority and concurrence disagreed over the meaning of “recess,” they both
agreed on this basic purpose. Compare NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (“The
Clause gives the President authority to make appointments during ‘the recess of the Senate’ so that
the President can ensure the continued functioning of the Federal Government when the Senate is
away.”); and id. at 2556-57, 2567 (concluding that the Constitution allows the President to fill
vacancies during both intersession and intrasession recesses, and to fill vacancies that occur at any
time, but that a recess of “less than 10 days is presumptively too short to fall within the Clause”),
with id. at 2592, 2598 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (construing the Clause to provide a
much narrower presidential power to fill vacancies and asserting that this power was most useful in
the country’s early days, when senators were away from Washington, D.C., for extended periods and
could not act on nominees, but that today the Clause is “an anachronism [because t]he need it was
designed to fill no longer exists.”).
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federal government to serve the public, without concentrating power in a
single person or institution. The President and the Senate are the vessels
through which this power flows. But they have no special interest in, much
less rights to, this appointment scheme.
The same can be said of the provisions at issue in Burwell and Arizona
State Legislature. The Appropriations Clause does not give the House a special
interest in the way the executive branch spends money; instead, it places an
important constraint on executive discretion for the benefit of the broader
public.105 And one can certainly debate the meaning of the word “legislature”
in the Elections Clause (that is, whether the Clause allows different state
entities to establish congressional districts).106 But there seems to be little
doubt that the primary purpose of the Clause was to provide for the staffing—
the “election”—of the federal legislature. The states have initial authority to
establish districts and can perhaps use this power to influence the federal
government.107 But they do not have untrammeled control; in the event that
a State balks, Congress may step in and provide for the selection of its
members, so that “the existence of the Union” is not left “entirely at [the]
mercy” of the States.108 Accordingly, much like the Recess Appointments
Clause, the Elections Clause reflects the Constitution’s balance between a
constrained, but still workable, federal government. The provisions of the
structural Constitution are designed to serve the broader public interest; they
do not confer rights on specific government institutions.
Notably, as this discussion underscores, proponents of institutional
standing do not contend that government institutions should have standing

105 Even scholars who argue for fairly broad executive discretion over spending agree that the
purpose of the Clause was to protect the public from arbitrary executive action. See J. Gregory Sidak,
The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1162, 1167 (“That there must be a showing of legal
authority in order to draw funds from the Treasury ensures that the people will have notice of the
spending decisions of government.”); see also Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J.
1343, 1345 (1988) (arguing for a narrower presidential power and asserting that “Congress has not
only the power but also the duty to exercise legislative control over federal expenditures” so as to
constrain executive discretion over important policies).
106 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Compare Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2015) (interpreting the term to include all forms of
state lawmaking, including a state initiative), with id. at 2678 (Robert, C.J., dissenting) (asserting
that the term “legislature” applies only to the state representative body).
107 See Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV.
859, 862-63 (arguing that gerrymanders allow for state influence).
108 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“Congress may at any time by law make or alter such
regulations . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 59, supra note 21, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[A]n
exclusive power . . . in the hands of the State legislatures[] would leave the existence of the Union
entirely at their mercy.”); see also Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint
on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1227-28, 1232 (2012) (underscoring that Congress is
ultimately “sovereign” over federal elections).
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to sue as representatives of the public.109 Instead, courts and commentators
insist that institutions should have standing to protect their own interests in
their constitutional powers. Thus, in Burwell, the district court stated that the
House had standing to protect its “unique role in the appropriations process
prescribed by the Constitution, not held by the ordinary citizen,” and that
“perversion of that process inflicts on the House a particular injury quite
distinguishable from any suffered by the public generally.”110 Along the same
lines, Greene urges that the Senate should have had standing in Noel Canning
to vindicate “[t]he claimed constitutional injury” to “its institutional
prerogatives.”111 Thus, proponents of institutional standing treat institutions
as having an intrinsic interest in their constitutional powers. As this Part
demonstrates, this assumption—that government institutions have ownership
over, and even rights to, their constitutional powers—overlooks some basic
principles of our constitutional scheme.
The Constitution confers powers on and divides power among
institutions to serve the public at large. There are serious questions as to
whether the Madisonian scheme in fact fulfills its dual purposes of creating
an effective, but limited, government. But one point seems beyond dispute:
government institutions are not the beneficiaries of this scheme. Instead, they
are the vessels through which power flows. Government institutions have no
particularized, much less concrete, interest in their respective powers.
II. A LIMITING PRINCIPLE FOR GOVERNMENT STANDING
As Burwell and Arizona State Legislature illustrate, government entities
have in recent years increasingly taken their disputes from the statehouse to
the courthouse—often with the blessing of courts and commentators.
109 Supporters of institutional standing argue that institutions have a “particularized” interest in
their constitutional powers. Otherwise, courts and commentators appear to assume, these claims would
constitute “generalized grievances” that must be resolved in the political process, rather than in the
courts. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1974) (“[A]
generalized interest [in the enforcement of the structural Constitution] is too abstract to constitute a
‘case or controversy’ appropriate for judicial resolution . . . . Our system of government leaves many
crucial decisions to the political processes.” (footnote omitted)). In any event, for the reasons discussed
in Part II, an argument for representational standing would also be undermined by constitutional text,
structure, and history. There is no longstanding history of suits between government institutions to
enforce structural constitutional provisions (on behalf of the public or otherwise). See infra notes 164–
168 and accompanying text. Instead, our constitutional system gives government institutions a variety
of structural tools (like the presidential veto and congressional investigations) to enforce the structural
Constitution against alleged incursions by other institutions. See Section II.B. This structure indicates
that institutions should carry out their intergovernmental disputes in the political arena, rather than
taking their claims to court. Such a structural inference is, in turn, buttressed by the lack of history of
intergovernmental disputes.
110 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 72-73 (D.D.C. 2015).
111 Greene, supra note 4, at 127 (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, there is a pressing need today to articulate the boundaries of
government standing. Drawing on constitutional structure, history, and
precedent, this Article offers a theory of the scope and limits of government
standing. This theory further underscores why government institutions
should not be permitted to sue one another over alleged “institutional
injuries”—that is, claims of harm to their constitutional powers or duties.
Although governments are in certain respects special litigants, who can
invoke federal jurisdiction even when private parties cannot, such special
standing is limited to certain classes of cases. I articulate here a principle that
unites these cases: governments have broad standing to perform functions
that they cannot perform without resort to the Article III courts.
Governments must have standing when they seek to impose sanctions on
individuals; due process principles require judicial review in such cases. This
principle explains the judiciary’s long acceptance of federal and state
government standing to enforce and defend their respective laws, and the
equally established (but less well-known) rule that each house of Congress
has standing to defend its power to hold nonmembers in contempt.
By contrast, under our constitutional system, government institutions
have alternative mechanisms to enforce the public interest in the structural
Constitution. Institutions can use structural tools (like the presidential veto,
the appropriations power, or congressional investigations) to object to
incursions by other government entities on their constitutional powers. We
can thus make a structural inference that government institutions should rely
on those structural tools, not lawsuits, to protect the public interest in our
scheme of separated powers and federalism.112 Such a structural inference has
strong historical support: there is no history of lawsuits between government
institutions over the structural Constitution. In sum, government institutions
can and should battle one another without resort to an Article III court.113

112 Put another way, government institutions should not have standing to sue one another, even
as representatives of the public. For a discussion of the widely accepted practice of making inferences
from constitutional structure, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-32 (1969).
113 Notably, as discussed below, state institutions have mechanisms under state law to object to
incursions by other state entities—the scenario in Arizona State Legislature. See infra subsection
II.B.2. Some readers may doubt that government institutions will in fact use these structural tools,
at least against a government entity controlled by the same political party. I discuss these concerns
below but offer a brief preview here. First, there is evidence that government institutions do use
these tools. See infra subsection II.B.1.b. Second, even if government entities are less likely to use
these tools during periods of unified government (and, conversely, will do so primarily during
periods of divided government), permitting institutional standing is no panacea. Those same
government entities will also likely bring suit only during periods of divided government. Thus,
allowing institutional standing would simply permit government entities to take their (largely
partisan) disputes from the statehouse to the courthouse. See infra Section III.B.
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A. The Lessons of Structure, History, and Precedent
1. Standing to Enforce and Defend the Law
Article III provides that the federal “judicial Power shall extend to
[certain] Cases . . . [and] Controversies” involving both the United States and
the States.114 But the constitutional text is noticeably silent about what types
of “cases” and “controversies” governments may bring—that is, about the
scope of government standing. As scholars have begun to recognize, other
constitutional principles and provisions help inform the meaning of Article
III “cases” and “controversies” in this context.115
One of those background principles is the concept that a sovereign
government must have standing to enforce and defend its laws in court.
Indeed, this principle is so uncontroversial that the Supreme Court rarely
considers the standing of the state or federal government to pursue those
sovereign interests (at least when the government is represented by its
executive branch).116 Accordingly, in sharp contrast to private parties,
governments may invoke federal jurisdiction to enforce or to protect the
continued enforceability of their laws, absent any showing of concrete injury.117
United States v. Lopez118 illustrates this principle. The federal government
brought a criminal prosecution against Alfonso Lopez for violating the Gun–
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1–2.
See, e.g., Seth Davis, Standing Doctrine’s State Action Problem, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585,
589 (2015) (arguing that due process and separation of powers principles inform standing doctrine);
Grove, Standing Outside, supra note 13, at 1314–16 (urging that Article II and Article I help define
executive and legislative standing to represent the United States); Grove, When Can a State, supra
note 13, at 854-56 (explaining how history and principles of federalism inform state standing); see
also Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. L.
REV. 243, 296–306 (2011) (arguing that state enforcement of federal criminal law would raise Article
II concerns as well as standing questions).
116 There is an important debate over whether a legislature can represent its government in court. The
Supreme Court has suggested that state legislatures may represent their governments, at least when
authorized by state law. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 US 43, 65 (1997). By contrast,
the Court has never decided whether Congress or its components may represent the United States in
court. In past work, I have argued against such legislative standing. See Grove, Standing Outside, supra note
13, at 1353-65. Other scholars, by contrast, have insisted that Congress or one of its components may
represent the United States, at least in defense of federal law. See Brianne Gorod, Defending Executive NonDefense & the Principal-Agent Problem, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1201, 1248 (2012); Greene, Interpretive
Schizophrenia, supra note 9, at 582, 595-97 (favoring both institutional standing and standing to “litigate . . .
on behalf of the United States”). I do not seek to revisit that issue here.
117 See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895) (stating that the federal government’s obligation to
enforce the law “is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court”); see also Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2013) (“No one doubts that a State has a cognizable interest ‘in the
continued enforceability’ of its laws” (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 26 (1960) (holding that Congress may “authorize the United States” to
enforce civil rights laws).
118 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
114
115
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Free School Zones Act of 1990.119 No one asked how the federal government
was harmed when Lopez brought a firearm to his high school in San Antonio,
Texas. Nor did anyone question the government’s standing to appeal and
defend the constitutionality of the federal law, when the Fifth Circuit struck
it down as a violation of the Commerce Clause.120 The federal judiciary
accepted that, in contrast to private parties, the federal executive has standing
simply to enforce and defend federal law on behalf of the United States.
The Supreme Court has likewise recognized the broad standing of state
governments to protect state law. Although state governments do not
typically seek to enforce their laws in federal court,121 they must often defend
those laws against constitutional or other challenges. And when a lower court
strikes down a state law, the federal judiciary accepts that the State may
appeal.122 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees123 provides an example. The case arose out of
a determination by a Minnesota state agency that the Jaycees, a private social
club, violated state antidiscrimination law by excluding women.124 The
Jaycees brought suit in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the
State’s effort to force them to accept female members violated their First
Amendment right to freedom of association.125 When the Jaycees prevailed
in the lower court, no one doubted the State’s standing to appeal and defend
its law against that constitutional challenge.126
The judiciary’s longstanding acceptance of government standing in these
cases makes a great deal of sense. A government must often go through an
Article III court to enforce its laws. After all, a government generally cannot,
See id. at 551.
See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993).
They do on occasion. Beginning in 1815, Congress allowed federal revenue officers to
remove state court actions, including criminal prosecutions, to federal court. See Tennessee v. Davis,
100 U.S. 257, 267-69, 271 (1879) (allowing removal of a murder prosecution). In the post-Civil War
era, Congress also authorized private individuals to remove state court actions, if they could show
that the state courts would not protect their civil rights. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 794805 (1966); see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 323-24 (1879) (concluding that removal of a murder
prosecution was improper under the statute); Collins & Nash, supra note 115, at 278-84 (discussing
the removal statutes). Notably, the Supreme Court has not doubted state standing to appeal cases
removed under these provisions—even when the State’s only interest was the enforcement of state
criminal law. See, e.g., Georgia, 384 U.S. at 792-93, 805-06 (ruling on the merits of the State’s appeal
and concluding that removal was proper).
122 See, e.g., Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245
(2015) (seeking review of a decision striking down an application of the State’s specialty license
program on First Amendment grounds); Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 55–56 (2010) (seeking review
of a decision setting aside a robbery conviction).
123 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
124 See id. at 612–16.
125 See id. at 615–16.
126 The Court ultimately upheld the application of the state antidiscrimination law to the
Jaycees. See id. at 623, 631.
119
120
121
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consistent with the requirements of due process, simply impose criminal or
civil penalties on private parties; there must be judicial review (at least after
the fact).127 Accordingly, absent standing to enforce its laws in court, the
government could not implement many laws at all.
Moreover, as I have argued in prior work, a government’s defense of its
laws is part and parcel of those enforcement efforts.128 Alfonso Lopez, for
example, did not deny that he carried a weapon onto his school’s campus;
instead, he sought to defeat the criminal prosecution solely by challenging
the constitutionality of the Gun–Free School Zones Act.129 Accordingly, in
order to continue its enforcement action, the government had to defend its
law against that constitutional challenge.130 A government must also defend
its laws to ensure their enforceability in future cases. In Roberts, once a lower
court invalidated Minnesota’s antidiscrimination law, the State risked losing
its power to sanction not only the Jaycees but also any other entity that might
improperly exclude women (or another group). The State thus had to appeal
to protect its legitimate “interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its
laws.”131 In sum, a government often could not implement its laws at all,
absent standing to enforce and defend those laws in an Article III court.132
127 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .”).
128 See Grove, Standing Outside, supra note 13, at 1329–32, 1358–60.
129 See Brief for Respondent at 8, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (No. 93-1260)
(noting that Lopez admitted to carrying the gun for use in a “gang war”).
130 My argument depends on the connection between enforcement and defense. That is, I
contend that the federal and state governments have standing to defend laws in order to ensure their
continued enforceability in future cases. See Grove, Standing Outside, supra note 13, at 1359-60 (“The
[federal] executive branch does not have standing [to appeal and defend a law] merely to offer its views
on a constitutional question or to seek a Supreme Court resolution of the question. The executive has
standing because, absent an appeal, the law can no longer be enforced against (at least) the parties to
that case.”); see also Grove, When Can a State, supra note 13, at 859-62 (explaining that state governments
likewise have standing to defend state laws in order to preserve the continued enforceability of those
laws). Relatedly, I assert that governments have broad standing only to defend laws that regulate their
citizens. Under this view, governments lack standing to defend laws that merely declare citizens to be
exempt from legal requirements. One example of such a “declaratory” law may be Virginia’s statute
(enacted in the wake of the Affordable Care Act) announcing that private citizens should not be
required to purchase health insurance. See Grove, When Can a State, supra note 13, at 859-62, 876-80
(discussing the Virginia law and asserting that states lack standing to protect “declaratory” state laws
that will not be enforced against anyone).
131 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 701 (2013) (denying private party standing to defend
state law, absent a separate concrete injury, but stating that “[n]o one doubts that a State has a
cognizable interest ‘in the continued enforceability’ of its laws that is harmed by a judicial decision
declaring a state law unconstitutional.”) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986)).
132 In past work, I have argued that similar principles support state standing to sue the federal
government, challenging federal statutes or agency actions that preempt, or otherwise undermine
the enforceability of, state laws regulating private individuals. See Grove, When Can a State, supra
note 13, at 854-55, 863-76. I argued that such standing not only has historical support but also is a
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2. The Contempt Power
Similar principles explain why each house of Congress has standing in
contempt cases. The House of Representatives and the Senate could not
protect their decisions to hold individuals in contempt, absent standing to
defend those decisions in federal court.133 For this reason, scholars are simply
wrong to assert that the contempt power supports standing to raise a range
of “institutional injuries.”134
To understand this point, some history is in order. Beginning in the late
eighteenth century, each house of Congress exercised what is known as the
“inherent contempt power.”135 Notably, this power had been exercised by both
houses of Parliament and colonial and state legislatures—and was so well accepted
at the Founding that it has aptly been dubbed a “constitutional backdrop.”136
reasonable extension of state standing to defend state law. A federal statute or regulation that
preempts a state law has much the same impact as a judicial decision striking down the state law; in
both scenarios, the State is hindered in its ability to enforce the law against future private parties.
See id. at 876-80. Some readers may, however, assert that such standing is in tension with the limiting
principle I have articulated. The argument might be that a State need not have standing to sue the
United States in this context; a State could wait for a private party to challenge the (preemptive)
federal law. But a private party may never bring such a challenge; private parties may simply adhere
to federal requirements, particularly if they would face stiff penalties for violating federal law. Cf.
Wyoming v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1239–40 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding state standing in a
scenario where a private party would likely have had to violate federal criminal law to challenge the
preemption). Moreover, a State could not as readily protect its legitimate interest in “the continued
enforceability of its laws” through the political process. Cf. Maine, 477 U.S. at 137 (recognizing that
States often have standing to protect this interest). As discussed below (in subsection II.B.2), threats
to the power of specific state institutions have historically come from within the States themselves,
where state institutions have maximum political influence. The preemption threat, by contrast,
comes from the federal government. Thus, it is not clear that a State could protect its interest in
enforcing state law, absent standing to challenge federal preemption. I recognize, however, that this
vision of state standing is contestable. Nothing in this Article turns on one’s acceptance of my theory
of state standing to sue the federal government. Along the same lines, this Article does not address
the precise boundaries of federal government standing to sue a State (for example, to prevent state
interference with the enforcement of federal law). See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
393-94, 416 (2012) (ruling on the merits, and not discussing standing, in a lawsuit brought by the
United States to enjoin the enforcement of an Arizona immigration law on the ground that it was
preempted by federal law). I plan to explore that issue in future work.
133 Notably, in prior work, Neal Devins and I asserted that each house has standing to litigate subpoena
cases. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 627–28. But we did not address whether such standing supports
claims of “institutional injury.” I take on that task here. See infra notes 154–160 and accompanying text.
134 See Foley Testimony, Hearing, supra note 9, at 73, 77-78 (pointing to “subpoena cases” as support
for claims of “institutional injury”); McGowan, supra note 5, at 264 (same). See also Nash, supra note 4,
at 363-65, 373-75 (similarly emphasizing Congress’s well-established “power to gather information”).
135 See, e.g., Allen B. Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 S. CAL. L.
REV. 189, 190-94 (1967) (discussing contempt cases from 1795 to 1800).
136 Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1854-57 (2012); accord
Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1085, 1093-1119, 1119-23, 112327 (2009) (recounting the history of the inherent contempt power). Notably, there is room for debate over
whether each house’s investigative and contempt powers derive from the “legislative power” or each house’s
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For present purposes, it is important to understand the procedure used in
these inherent contempt cases. If the House of Representatives or the Senate
concludes that someone has breached its privileges (by, for example,
attempting to bribe a member of Congress or withholding information), the
chamber can hold the individual in “contempt.”137 The chamber can then direct
its sergeant at arms to arrest the person and place him in a congressional cell. 138
Accordingly, under the inherent contempt procedure, each house of Congress
has the authority to sanction—and even imprison—individuals.139
The case of John Anderson provides an early illustration. In 1818, the
House of Representatives received a report that Anderson had attempted to
bribe one of its members.140 So the House directed its sergeant at arms to
arrest Anderson and place him in a congressional prison.141 After a hearing at
the House of Representatives (a proceeding in which Anderson was
represented by counsel and could present witnesses), the House found him
guilty of “a contempt and a violation of the privileges of the House.”142
But a house of Congress cannot, consistent with due process principles,
unilaterally punish contemnors. There must be an opportunity for judicial review
(at least after the fact). In Anderson, the alleged contemnor filed suit against the
power to determine “the Rules of its Proceedings.” See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (granting to Congress its
legislative powers), 5, cl. 1-2 (granting each house the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings”).
Compare, e.g., Bernard Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 CALIF. L. REV.
3, 11 (1959) (emphasizing “the grant of legislative power”), with Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 574-75,
597-98 (focusing on the Rules of Proceedings Clause). For present purposes, the important point is that if
one accepts that each chamber has a contempt power (of whatever source), each chamber must also have
standing to protect that power.
137 In 1796, the House of Representatives held an individual in contempt for attempting to
bribe House members. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 221-29 (1796).
138 Some scholars have asserted that the U.S. Capitol has its own jail. Infra note 139. The
picture appears to be a bit more complicated. Alleged contemnors were typically held in a spare
room at the Capitol or at a nearby hotel, not in a specified “jail.” See HISTORY, ART AND ARCHIVES,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: Room Service in the Clink: The Case of the Consumptive
Witness (Aug. 1, 2013), http://history.house.gov/Blog/2013/August/8-02-Capitol-Jail/ (“No evidence
suggests that any room in the Capitol was ever designated for use as a jail . . . . [I]ndividuals the
House has found to be in contempt, and, thus, detained, were . . . held temporarily in the offices of
the Sergeant at Arms, locked in committee anterooms, or put under guard at local hotels.”). Today,
the House or the Senate would likely ask that any contemnor be placed in a holding cell maintained
by the Capitol police. See Tessa Berenson & Lily Rothman, Can Congress Jail Witnesses Who Refuse to
Cooperate?, TIME (Nov. 15, 2017), http://time.com/5023920/trump-russia-election-congress-capitoljail/ (noting that “the Capitol Police do maintain a holding cell a few blocks away” from the Capitol);
see also Todd David Peterson, Contempt of Congress v. Executive Privilege, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 77,
88 (2011) (noting that the inherent contempt procedure has not been used since 1932).
139 See Chafetz, supra note 136, at 1152 (“[E]ach house has a sergeant-at-arms, and the Capitol building
has its own jail.”); see also Peterson, supra note 138, at 87-88 (explaining the process for confining a
congressional witness).
140 Moreland, supra note 135, at 194-95.
141 Id. at 195.
142 Id.
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sergeant at arms for false imprisonment and assault and battery.143 More often,
each house’s “detainees” have filed habeas corpus petitions in federal court.144
In order to protect their contempt findings, the House and Senate must
defend their actions in these judicial proceedings. Although neither house
must establish standing when the alleged contemnor initiates the litigation,
each house must have standing to appeal.145 And as with government
enforcement actions more generally, federal courts have consistently
recognized the standing of the House and the Senate to defend their power
to punish alleged contemnors.
McGrain v. Daugherty146 offers an example. In 1924, a Senate committee
opened an investigation of former Attorney General Harry Daugherty for his
alleged failure to prosecute violations of the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act.147 When one witness (the Attorney General’s brother Mally Daugherty)
refused to comply with a subpoena for testimony, the Senate held him in
contempt and directed its sergeant at arms to take him into custody.148
Deputy Sergeant at Arms John McGrain then arrested Daugherty.149 When a
lower court granted Daugherty’s habeas corpus petition, no one questioned
the Senate’s standing to appeal (through its deputy sergeant at arms) and
defend its contempt finding.150 Instead, the Supreme Court went straight to
the merits, confirming that “the power of inquiry—with process to enforce
it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”151

143 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 204 (1821); see also id. at 229-31 (affirming the
contempt power but stating “imprisonment must terminate with [Congress’s] . . . adjournment”).
144 See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 196 (1880) (granting a habeas petition sought
by an individual held in contempt and imprisoned by the House). Such habeas actions are brought
against the sergeant at arms in his official capacity, both because he is the custodian, and because an
action against a member of Congress would violate the Speech or Debate Clause. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [members of Congress] shall not be
questioned.”); Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 200-05 (holding that a habeas action could proceed against the
sergeant at arms, but not against members of Congress).
145 See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 152 (1935) (upholding, on appeal brought by the
Senate’s sergeant at arms, a contempt citation against a person who allegedly destroyed papers
subpoenaed by a Senate committee); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927) (upholding, on
appeal brought by the Senate’s deputy sergeant at arms, a contempt citation where a witness refused
to testify in front of a committee).
146 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 135.
147 See id. at 151-52; 65 CONG. REC. 3299 (1924) (documenting the proceedings of the relevant
congressional hearing).
148 McGrain, 273 U.S. at 152-54; Moreland, supra note 135, at 219 (discussing McGrain).
149 See McGrain, 273 U.S. at 153-54 (noting the Senate “command[ed] the sergeant at arms or
his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found”).
150 See id. at 150 (“This is an appeal from the final order in a proceeding in habeas corpus discharging a
recusant witness held in custody under process of attachment issued from the United States Senate . . . .”).
151 Id. at 174; see id. at 180 (holding that “the Senate [was] entitled to have [Mally Daugherty]
give testimony”).
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Despite this lengthy history and judicial blessing, neither house of
Congress has relied on its inherent contempt power since 1932.152 That is,
neither chamber has imprisoned an individual for contempt or, relatedly,
sought to defend that action in federal court. Instead, since the mid-twentieth
century, the House and Senate have often used a different approach: each
chamber has filed an affirmative suit in federal court to enforce a subpoena
against a recalcitrant witness.153
For example, in 2007, a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives
investigated the firing of nine U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush
administration.154 When White House Counsel Harriet Miers and Chief of
Staff Josh Bolton refused to comply with a subpoena for testimony and
documents, the House held them in contempt.155 But the House did not send
its sergeant at arms to arrest either Miers or Bolton. Instead, it filed suit,
seeking a judicial order compelling compliance with the subpoena.156 Four
years later, a Republican-controlled House sought documents from President
Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder in connection with its investigation
of the so-called Fast and Furious gun-running scandal.157 When the Attorney
General failed to produce all of the documents, the House held him in
contempt—and then filed suit to enforce its subpoena.158

152 Peterson, supra note 138, at 88; see Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Counsels
with Congressional Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1616 (2000) (“The main problem with this
[inherent contempt] procedure is that it requires a house to hold a time-consuming trial.”).
153 See LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 181 (6th ed. 2014) (noting the rise of this method in the late 1970s). Each house can also
rely on the criminal “contempt of Congress” statute, which permits the executive branch to
criminally prosecute an individual found by a chamber to be in “contempt.” See 2 U.S.C. §§ 192–194
(2018) (creating a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment for the refusal “to answer any
question pertinent to the question under inquiry”).
154 Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55
(D.D.C. 2008).
155 See id. at 64.
156 Notably, the House first asked the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia to prosecute
the executive officials under the criminal contempt statute. The House filed suit only when the
executive branch declined. See id.; supra note 153 (discussing the criminal contempt statute).
Ultimately, the parties settled the matter. See Peterson, supra note 138, at 117-18 (stating that the
executive offered to provide some documents and Rove and Miers agreed to testify in a closed
hearing).
157 Fast and Furious was a law enforcement operation to stem the flow of firearms from the
United States to drug cartels in Mexico. The operation went awry when one weapon (which U.S.
officials were supposed to be tracking) was used to kill a U.S. law enforcement officer. See Comm.
on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2013).
158 Once again, the House brought suit only after the executive branch declined to pursue a
criminal prosecution. See id. at 7-8; supra note 153 (discussing the criminal contempt statute).
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Each chamber’s standing to enforce compliance with subpoenas can be
justified as an extension of its inherent contempt power.159 As we have seen,
each house has traditionally had the power to apprehend and imprison
individuals who fail to comply with its investigations. But there must be
judicial review at least after the fact (most likely through a habeas corpus
action). In such after-the-fact review proceedings, each house clearly has
standing to defend its contempt finding. Accordingly, it seems reasonable that
each house also has standing to seek judicial review before the fact.160
There are some lingering questions surrounding these subpoena actions—
and the scope of the House and Senate’s inherent contempt power more
generally.161 This Article does not seek to enter those debates. The important
point, for my purposes, is that each chamber’s contempt power is sui generis. In
this context alone, the House and the Senate act as “mini governments”—with
the power to punish and even imprison individuals. Like governments more
generally, each house must have standing to defend its power to impose such
sanctions (before or after the fact).162 But contrary to the suggestion of some
scholars,163 this unique context does not support standing to sue over a range
159 For purposes of this analysis, I assume that each house could use its inherent contempt power
against any executive branch official. Notably, the Office of Legal Counsel has asserted that this power
may not be used in at least one context: when a high-level executive official refuses to provide
information on the ground that it is protected by executive privilege (as was the scenario in Miers and
Holder). See Theodore B. Olson, Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch
Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101, 140 n.42
(1984). There are reasons to doubt the executive branch’s position. See Chafetz, supra note 136, at 113243, 1145 (drawing on historical evidence to argue that the inherent contempt power extends to all
executive officials). This debate is beyond the scope of this Article but could (in my view) ultimately
be hammered out in court. That is, if the House or Senate did imprison a high-level executive official
(a seemingly unlikely scenario today), that official could file a habeas corpus petition and the House
or Senate would have standing to defend and appeal any adverse lower court decision.
160 Notably, Michael Rappaport at one point hinted at this conceptualization of subpoena
actions. See Rappaport, supra note 152, at 1619 (“[I]t is essential to view this power [to enforce a
subpoena] in conjunction with the traditional power of a legislative house to punish contempts.”).
By contrast, Josh Chafetz has argued that the houses of Congress should not bring subpoena actions,
at least against the executive. Each chamber should either rely on its inherent contempt power or
use other political tools to enforce compliance. See Chafetz, supra note 136, at 1152-53.
161 See supra note 159 (discussing one debate over the scope of the inherent contempt power). There
are, for example, questions about whether each house has a statutory cause of action. See Miers, 558 F.
Supp. 2d at 81-88 (noting the issue but finding a cause of action under the Declaratory Judgment Act); see
also E. Garrett West, Revisiting Contempt of Congress, 2019 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (draft on file
with author) (raising various questions about the inherent contempt power).
162 Accordingly, the federal district courts were correct to find standing in Miers and Holder—
although they did not do so on the grounds offered here. In fact, the federal courts’ analyses could be
construed (like other recent case law) as sympathetic to broader claims of “institutional injury.” See
Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 68-71, 78 (stating in part that the House was “an institutional plaintiff asserting
an institutional injury”); see also Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (urging that Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997), does not foreclose congressional standing to “assert its institutional interests in court”).
163 See sources cited supra note 134.
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of “institutional injuries.” As I argue below, government institutions can object
to incursions on their official powers, without resort to an Article III court.
B. Structural Tools to Assert Constitutional Powers and Duties
There is no history of government standing to sue another government
entity over an alleged “institutional injury.” The Supreme Court emphasized
this point, albeit only in dicta, in Raines v. Byrd, when it held that six legislators
lacked standing to challenge the Line Item Veto Act based on an alleged
“institutional injury.”164 (The plaintiffs in that case claimed that their “Article
I voting power” would be “diluted” if the President could veto specific parts
of legislation.)165 The Raines Court emphasized that in past “confrontations
between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch,” involving
the President’s removal power, the pocket veto, and the legislative veto, “no
suit was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or
power.”166 Instead, the issues were brought to the judiciary by “plaintiff[s] with
traditional Article III standing.”167 As the Court observed, this “historical
practice” tends to cut against any claim of “institutional injury.”168
I argue that there is a principled reason for this historical rejection of
institutional standing. The federal and state governments have broad standing
only to perform functions that they cannot perform without resort to the
federal courts. As discussed, a government must have standing when it seeks
to impose sanctions on individuals; due process principles require judicial
review in such cases. By contrast, government institutions can interact with
one another—and in the process enforce the public interest in the structural
Constitution—without the involvement of an Article III court.169
1. Structural Mechanisms for the Federal Branches
a. An Overview
The federal Constitution gives the branches of the federal government
many mechanisms to assert their constitutional powers. The President can,
for example, veto170 or (if enacted) refuse to enforce measures that interfere
See 521 U.S. 811, 814, 817, 821, 829-830 (1997).
See id. at 817.
Id. at 826-29.
Id. at 827.
Id. at 826, 826-28.
Some readers may question whether government institutions will do “enough” to enforce
the structural Constitution. That depends on one’s assumptions about both institutional incentives
and the underlying merits of a given constitutional issue. I discuss those concerns below. See infra
subsection II.B.1.b, Section III.B; see also supra note 113.
170 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
164
165
166
167
168
169
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with presidential prerogatives.171 Notably, the executive branch must go
through the courts in order to enforce federal law against private parties; the
executive does not need the courts when it declines to enforce the law. The
President’s position in the constitutional structure also enables him to use
other tools to assert his institutional authority. Most notably, the President
can use “soft law”—signing statements or other nonbinding declarations—to
raise concerns about interference with his constitutional duties.172 And the
President can always rely on the “bully pulpit” to alert the public about (what
he perceives as) violations of his Article II powers.173
Likewise, Congress or each house separately can assert its institutional
authority in a variety of ways. The House of Representatives or the Senate
can object to executive interference by refusing an annual appropriations
request.174 As Josh Chafetz has emphasized, although both houses must act in
concert (and with the President) to enact spending legislation, either chamber
is free to reject a funding request.175 The Senate can also delay hearings on
presidential nominees.176 And each chamber can, much like the executive, use
“soft law” like congressional resolutions to communicate its discontent to
other institutions and to the broader public. Notably, such “soft law” matters,
because of each chamber’s formal role in the constitutional structure. As Jacob
Gersen and Eric Posner have forcefully argued, although such resolutions are
not formally binding, they do influence actors in other institutions, in part
because they signal formal actions that lawmakers may take in the future.177

171 Although scholars debate the scope of the President’s power, most commentators today
seem to agree that the President has at least some discretion not to enforce laws that he deems
unconstitutional. See, e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s
Non-Enforcement Power, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 89-90 (2000).
172 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 573, 575 (2008) (noting that signing statements could be considered a form of “soft law,”
declarations that are not formally binding but still exert influence).
173 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“No other personality in public life can begin to compete with [the President] in access
to the public mind through modern methods of communications.”).
174 Although the Constitution does not require annual appropriations, that has been the
longstanding practice. See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 725-27 (2012);
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (placing a two-year limit on appropriations for the army, but
not otherwise limiting the duration of appropriations).
175 See Chafetz, supra note 174, at 725 (“The annual budget process guarantees that, every year, each
house of Congress has the opportunity to give meaningful voice to its priorities and its discontentments.”).
176 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for . . . .”).
177 See Gersen & Posner, supra note 172, at 575, 577-79 (“Agencies, courts, and the President
regularly incorporate legislative views . . . .”).
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Moreover, the House and Senate can investigate alleged executive
interference with congressional power. Although scholars debate the
constitutional source of this investigative power (whether it stems from the
general grant of “legislative power” or the more specific authority of each
chamber to establish its internal rules), no one seems to doubt each chamber’s
authority to conduct investigations.178 Thus, the House of Representatives
did not need to bring suit in Burwell to raise objections about the Obama
administration’s handling of the Affordable Care Act. The House could have
opened an investigation into the spending practices of the Department of
Health and Human Services. Notably, although the House must rely on the
courts to enforce any contempt finding, the House can conduct other aspects
of an investigation, without resort to an Article III court. Many congressional
investigations have occurred without any judicial involvement. Such an
investigation would not only provide the House with potentially valuable
information but would also serve as a congressional “bully pulpit,” raising
public awareness about any executive wrongdoing.179 And, if all else fails, the
House and Senate can threaten (and the House can even commence)
impeachment proceedings against recalcitrant executive officials.180
This variety of mechanisms helps overcome an objection that scholars have
raised about reliance on the political process. Supporters of institutional standing
have argued in particular that the impeachment and appropriation powers are
overly blunt instruments. Although members of Congress may be angry about
one presidential “error,” they may not believe he should lose his job.181 Nor may
a house of Congress want to cut off funding for an important program, simply
because of one (possibly unrelated) presidential mistake.182 Litigation, these
178 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. There may, however, be debates over the scope
of each house’s investigative authority.
179 Indeed, every exercise of power can be seen as a public relations campaign. Under the
Madisonian design, the ultimate judge of “who wins” in this battle among government institutions
is the electorate. See Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints:
Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARV. L. REV. 617, 618 (2010)
(“[S]eparation of powers enhances the efficacy of the electoral constraint on politicians . . . . “).
180 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (stating that the House of Representatives
“shall have the sole Power of Impeachment” and that “[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try
all Impeachments.”). For important and illuminating accounts of presidential impeachment, see
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017); LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA
MATZ, TO END A PRESIDENCY: THE POWER OF IMPEACHMENT (2018).
181 See Foley Testimony, Hearing, supra note 9, at 93-94 (“[I]mpeachment is a drastic political
remedy that should be a very last resort, not encouraged by courts as a preferable alternative to a
peaceful judicial determination of constitutional parameters.”) (emphasis in original); see also Nash,
supra note 4, at 383-84 (“While judicial intervention might not be the preferred means by which to
resolve an interbranch dispute, still it seems infinitely preferable to the prospect of impeachment.”).
182 Supporters of institutional standing have argued that budget cuts are particularly inappropriate
when the complaint is presidential nonenforcement of a law. How, commentators wonder, can the
executive enforce the law without any money? See Foley Testimony, Hearing, supra note 9, at 93 (“asking
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scholars argue, is a much better way for legislators to raise their concerns, because
lawsuits can focus on a single area of presidential wrongdoing.183
But this argument overlooks the range of options that lawmakers have to
challenge executive action. Each house can, for example, use its investigative
power to zero in on one area of executive misconduct—as illustrated by the
inquiry into the U.S. Attorney firings and the Fast-and-Furious scandal.184
Likewise, the House or Senate can adopt resolutions criticizing a specific
form of alleged presidential misconduct, such as the expenditures at issue in
Burwell. Moreover, commentators have failed to appreciate that many of these
structural tools are best understood as bargaining chips; a house of Congress
may be able to extract concessions from the President by threatening to cut
off funds, without actually doing so.185 The constitutional structure offers
many mechanisms, short of actual budget cuts or impeachment, for each
house to register its disapproval of the executive branch—and to assert the
institutional power of Congress.
b. Structural Mechanisms in Practice.
Government entities have in fact used these structural tools to assert their
institutional authority. Significantly, that is true with respect to “institutional
injuries” that have been the subject of recent commentary. Supporters of
institutional standing have argued, for example, that the Senate should have
standing to protect its power to ratify treaties; that the House may sue to
preserve its role in originating revenue legislation; and that the President

Congress to defund a law it simply wants to have faithfully executed is like asking Congress to cut off its
nose to spite its face—a self-defeating overreaction that would make faithful execution of the law harder,
not easier.”) (emphasis in original). It is doubtful that the appropriations power is so blunt an instrument.
After all, lawmakers do not have to cut off funding for the program they want enforced; they could take
away funds for some other presidential priority. Nevertheless, this commentary suggests a more basic
objection: that cutting off funding for important programs could harm the beneficiaries of those programs,
without necessarily modifying presidential conduct.
183 See Nash, supra note 4, at 383-84 (arguing that Congress should not be required to “resort to
impeachment before commencing a lawsuit,” because that would mean “a fundamental constitutional
showdown with the President, and one . . . not at all likely to be focused on the underlying policy dispute.”);
Bethany R. Pickett, Note, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing in Instances of
Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 465 (2016) (“Judicial intervention is preferable to
impeachment because it addresses the President’s particular area of wrongdoing, instead of broadly attacking
the President and, in effect, throwing the baby out with the bathwater.”).
184 See supra notes 154–158 and accompanying text.
185 See Chafetz, supra note 174, at 732-35 (recounting how the Republican-controlled House
gained concessions from the Obama administration by credibly threatening a government shutdown).
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should have had standing to challenge the legislative veto as an infringement
on his executive power.186
In each context, government institutions have relied on structural tools to
object to incursions on their constitutional powers and duties. The Senate has
used “soft law” to protect its treaty power, issuing declarations demanding that
certain types of international agreements, such as those pertaining to arms
control or human rights, be submitted for Senate approval.187 Scholars report that
such declarations have had the intended impact; presidents have been reluctant
to bypass the Senate on such matters.188 The House, for its part, has used another
form of “soft law”—House resolutions—to object to Senate bills that (in the view
of the House majority) circumvent the Origination Clause.189
For many years, presidents also condemned the legislative veto as
congressional overreach. Both Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan
complained (through signing statements and other messages to Congress) that
the veto was unconstitutional; each President also threatened to disregard some
legislative vetoes of administrative action.190 The House and the Senate, in turn,
fought back by warning that they might not appropriate money for certain agency
actions, unless the executive branch abided by these statutory provisions.191
186 See supra notes 6–8 and accompanying text; Greene, supra note 94, at 1699-1700 (urging
that the Attorney General had “a strong institutional interest . . . in the threat of a one-house veto
of his decision to suspend deportation”).
187 See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126
HARV. L. REV. 411, 473-76 (2012) (asserting that many “high-profile international agreements are
typically processed as Article II treaties rather than congressional-executive agreements,” in large part
because of constitutionally based insistence by the Senate); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The
Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 800-11 (2001) (recounting
that many major international agreements in the areas of arms control, human rights, extradition, and
the environment have been concluded through the treaty process, and asserting that “[i]n part, this
consistent treaty practice seems to have resulted from Senate efforts to defend its prerogatives”).
188 See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 187, at 473-76; Yoo, supra note 187, at 806, 800-11 (noting
the impact of “Senate efforts to defend its prerogatives”).
189 See CHAFETZ, supra note 58, at 32-33 (“The House protects this prerogative through ‘blue
slips,’ resolutions [on blue paper] that assert that a bill that has originated in the Senate . . . ‘in the
opinion of this House, contravenes [the Origination Clause] . . . and . . .shall be respectfully
returned to the Senate with . . . this resolution.’”).
190 See President Jimmy Carter, Legislative Vetoes: Message to Congress (June 21, 1978), in
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JIMMY CARTER 1978, at 1146-49
(announcing that legislative veto provisions are unconstitutional, and that his administration would
not view them as “legally binding”); President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing International
Security and Foreign Assistance Legislation (Dec. 29, 1981), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN 1981, at 1203 (objecting to legislative
vetoes on constitutional and policy grounds).
191 See BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL
STRUGGLE 109, 129, 158 (1988) (recounting how the Carter administration’s “commitment to
oppos[ing] legislative vetoes had become difficult to sustain” when “programs and funding were
being held up while the pro- and anti-veto forces on the Hill fought over whether vetoes would be
attached to authorizing legislation.”).
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We can certainly debate whether each institution did enough to protect
its constitutional powers or, relatedly, whether any given political resolution
was the “right” one. The answers to these questions, of course, depend on
one’s assessment of the underlying constitutional issue.192 But there is no
question that each institution had the power to defend its institutional
authority and thereby protect the public interest in the structural
Constitution, without resort to an Article III court.
These institutional disputes (over the treaty process, revenue bills, and the
legislative veto) are thus categorically different from a government’s enforcement
and defense of its laws, or a house of Congress’s enforcement of contempt sanctions.
Due process principles require judicial review when governments seek to impose
sanctions on individuals. By contrast, government institutions can battle one
another, without the involvement of an Article III court.
2. State Institutions
State institutions also have mechanisms for defending their official powers
and duties under the U.S. Constitution. As discussed, although we generally
think of the role of the State as a whole in the federal scheme, the
Constitution does confer some powers directly on state institutions. For
example, Article V provides that amendments may be ratified by threefourths of state legislatures.193 And as Arizona State Legislature illustrates, the
Elections Clause of Article I provides that the “Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof.”194
Notably, threats to these constitutional powers have not historically come
from the federal government. Instead, any challenges to state institutional
authority come from within the states themselves.195 Hawke v. Smith, for
example, involved a 1918 Ohio constitutional provision, which prevented the
state legislature from ratifying a federal constitutional amendment on its
own; any such ratification had to be approved by state voters in a subsequent
referendum.196 The goal was apparently to block ratification of the Eighteenth
192 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953–54, 959 (1983) (holding the legislative veto invalid in
all applications).
193 See U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths
of the several States . . . .”).
194 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
195 I therefore bracket the difficult question whether the analysis would be different if state
institutional authority were threatened by the federal government. For a discussion of how disputes between
states and the federal government pose unique challenges for the standing analysis, see supra note 132.
196 253 U.S. 221, 224-26 (1920).
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Amendment on prohibition.197 The Supreme Court held in Hawke (which,
notably, was brought by a private party) that this rule violated Article V.198
Likewise, in Arizona State Legislature, the independent commission gained its
authority over redistricting from the state constitution.199
This point is important because state institutions have maximum power
and influence within their own state constitutional systems.200 The state
executive or legislature can propose (and, together, often enact) state laws,
endeavor to amend the state constitution, and engage in media campaigns to
influence the public.201 The position of the Arizona state legislature provides
an illustration. The legislature could not take back control over redistricting
simply by enacting a statute (as one might expect, given that the legislature’s
power was removed by a state constitutional amendment).202 But under the
state constitution, the Arizona legislature still has the power to propose new

197 Id. at 224-25 (noting that the Ohio measure was adopted after the House and Senate
submitted the Eighteenth Amendment to the States).
198 Id. at 231. Notably, the Supreme Court at that time did not treat disputes over constitutional
amendments as “political questions.” See Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question
Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1912, 1929-32, 1944-46 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court
for much of our history adjudicated challenges to constitutional amendments on the merits). The
Court at that time also had a more relaxed approach to appellate standing—at least when reviewing
state court decisions on federal law. See infra Section II.C.1 (discussing this approach to appellate
review in connection with an analysis of Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)); see also Coleman,
307 U.S. at 438-39 (citing Hawke as an example of the Court’s willingness to review state court
decisions, whenever the state court held that it had jurisdiction over the federal claim).
199 See 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2658-59, 2668 (2015) (holding that the Elections Clause of the U.S.
Constitution permitted Arizona to adopt the constitutional amendment by popular initiative to
address the problem of gerrymandering since “[r]edistricting is a legislative function to be
performed in accordance with the State’s prescriptions for lawmaking”).
200 There are, of course, differences among the States. But it seems that all state constitutions give
a prominent role to the state legislature and executive. See, e.g., Separation of Powers—An Overview,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES,
at
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-statelegislatures/separation-of-powers-an-overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 18, 2019) (providing an overview of
state government structure).
201 See id.; Jonathan L. Marshfield, Improving Amendment, 69 ARK. L. REV. 477, 486 (2016) (“Fortynine states currently permit amendments by legislative approval, followed by a public referendum for
ratification [while Delaware] permits amendment by the legislature without a ratifying referendum.”); see
also THAD KOUSSER & JUSTIN H. PHILLIPS, THE POWER OF AMERICAN GOVERNORS 37 n.40 (2012)
(noting that “all governors in the United States possess the veto,” although observing that some have a
line-item veto and others do not); Richard Platkin, Government Reform from an Executive Perspective, 69
ALB. L. REV. 851, 854 (2006) (noting that “[t]he legislative process is definitely the Governor’s main
mechanism of reform” but that she can also influence “the constitutional reform process” in part because
“the Governor enjoys the privilege of the bully pulpit”).
202 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 14 (“[T]he legislature shall not have the power to
adopt any measure that supersedes, in whole or in part, any initiative measure . . . unless the
superseding measure furthers the purposes of the initiative.”); Ariz. Leg. Brief, supra note 3, at 18,
20 n.4 (“[A]bsent a constitutional amendment . . . the Legislature is forever barred from
‘prescrib[ing]’ Arizona’s congressional districts.”).
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amendments.203 So with the support of state voters, the legislature could
override a particular redistricting plan—or perhaps undo the independent
commission’s authority entirely.204
Accordingly, state institutions have ways to respond—through their own
state government systems—when their official powers and duties are
threatened by other state entities. This helps explain why there is no history
of suits by state institutions alleging an “institutional injury.” Like their
federal counterparts, state institutions have mechanisms to assert their
constitutional powers, without resort to an Article III court.
C. Understanding Coleman v. Miller
Constitutional structure, history, and precedent together undermine
government standing to assert institutional injuries. Scholars and jurists who
favor institutional standing, however, most frequently rely on the Supreme
Court’s 1939 decision in Coleman v. Miller.205 That case involved a group of
state legislators, not a government institution, but commentators assert that
the reasoning in the case supports claims of institutional injury. Although
some language in Coleman might be read that way, that is not a necessary or
even the best interpretation of the decision. This Article articulates an
alternative–and novel–interpretation: Coleman should be understood as a case
in which the Supreme Court applied a now-outdated rule of appellate
standing to hear a federal constitutional challenge from a state court.

203 See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, cl. 15; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXI, § 1 (providing that
“[a]ny amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in either house of the
legislature, or by initiative petition” and may then be submitted to the voters).
204 Id. Notably, the Arizona state legislature’s power to propose state constitutional
amendments is typical. See supra note 201 (noting that all state constitutions give the state legislature
some power to propose amendments).
205 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Jurists and scholars rely on what has become known as the “vote
nullification” theory. See infra subsection II.C.2. A few scholars have pointed to INS v. Chadha, where
the Supreme Court permitted the House and the Senate to intervene and defend the statutorily
created legislative veto. See 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983) (declaring Congress a “proper party” capable of
intervening in the case); Hall, supra note 4, at 19-20, 22, 26-28, 30-31 (examining the implications of
Chadha for the assertion of institutional injuries); see also Jackson, supra note 4 at 869-72 (recognizing
that Chadha is a complex decision but suggesting that the decision can be understood “narrowly to involve
standing to assert a specific legislative prerogative to vote under a federal statute”). My own view,
however, is that Chadha is, at best, doubtful support for “vote nullification” or any other theory of
congressional standing. As I have explained in earlier work, the Chadha Court did not hold that either
house had standing to appeal (to assert an “institutional injury” or otherwise). See Grove, Standing
Outside, supra note 13, at 1360-61. Moreover, as Neal Devins and I have shown, the Court’s further
assertion—that Congress may defend a federal statute, when the executive declines to do so—rested on
a misreading of history. See Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 580-93.
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1. Coleman and Appellate Review
Coleman v. Miller involved a constitutional challenge to the Child Labor
Amendment, which was proposed in 1924 but never ratified.206 The specific
facts arose out of Kansas. Although the state legislature had refused to ratify
the amendment in 1925, it revisited the issue in 1937.207 That year, the state
house of representatives voted in favor of ratification.208 The state senate split
evenly (twenty to twenty), but the lieutenant governor broke the tie by voting
in favor of the amendment.209
A group of Kansas legislators (including the twenty “no” voters in the state
senate) subsequently filed suit in state court.210 They objected in part to the
participation of the lieutenant governor, pointing out that Article V provides for
ratification by the state legislature, not the executive.211 They also argued that
Kansas could not undo its prior decision (rejecting ratification), and that the
amendment was invalid because it had not been ratified by three-fourths of the
States within a “reasonable time” since 1924.212 The state court rejected these
claims, so the plaintiff legislators sought further review in the Supreme Court.213
Writing (apparently) on behalf of a majority,214 Chief Justice Hughes
concluded that the legislators had standing to appeal the state court’s

206 See 307 U.S. 433, 435-37 (1939). The amendment was designed to overrule Court decisions
holding that Congress lacked power to prohibit child labor in the States. See DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT
AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995, at 257, 307-09, 469 (1996)
(discussing the amendment’s purpose in the context of labor problems of the 1920s and 1930s). The
amendment was rendered unnecessary in 1941 when the Court upheld Congress’s authority to regulate
labor conditions. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115-17 (1941) (“[W]e conclude that the
prohibition of the shipment interstate of goods produced under the forbidden . . . labor conditions is
within the constitutional authority of Congress.”); KYVIG, supra, at 313 (observing that, after Darby, “any
remaining feeling of need for the still-unratified [child labor] amendment evaporated”).
207 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435-36.
208 See id. at 436.
209 Id. at 435-36.
210 See id. at 436-37 (describing how the plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from the state
court prohibiting state officials from certifying that the amendment passed).
211 U.S. CONST. art. V (stating that amendments “shall be valid . . . when ratified by the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States.”); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446-47 (noting that the
plaintiffs contended that the lieutenant governor “was not a part of the ‘legislature’ so that under
Article V” he should not be “permitted to have a deciding vote on . . . ratification”).
212 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
213 Id. at 437.
214 Although Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion is styled as an “Opinion of the Court,” it was
joined by only two other Justices (Reed and Stone). Id. at 435. Justices Butler and McReynolds
urged the Court to reach the merits (and strike down the amendment), so they presumably found
standing. See id. at 470-74 (Butler, J., dissenting) (urging that the amendment was invalid because it
was not ratified within a reasonable time). But we do not know on what basis they found standing.
In any event, even if one assumes that Hughes wrote for a majority, his opinion focused primarily
on appellate jurisdiction over state courts.
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decision.215 Notably, the Chief Justice did not assert that the plaintiffs could
have originally brought the same suit in federal court. On the contrary, he
acknowledged (as Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence insisted) that the state
legislators may have lacked standing in federal district court.216 But, the Chief
Justice insisted, that should not preclude Supreme Court review of a state
court decision on federal law.217
To underscore this point, Hughes contrasted the Court’s treatment of two
prior cases involving the Nineteenth Amendment, which granted women the
right to vote.218 Leser v. Garnett arose in state court.219 A group of Maryland
voters filed the suit, demanding that the State remove two female voters from
the registration list, on the ground that the Nineteenth Amendment was
substantively and procedurally defective.220 When the state court rejected the
challenge, the Supreme Court agreed to review the case, noting that “[t]he
laws of Maryland authorize such a suit by a qualified voter against the Board
of Registry.”221 On the merits, the Court upheld the Nineteenth
Amendment.222 Fairchild v. Hughes, by contrast, was originally brought in
federal district court.223 The Supreme Court there held that a New York voter
lacked standing, concluding that his challenge to the Nineteenth Amendment
involved only a generalized interest in “requir[ing] that the Government be
administered according to law.”224
In Coleman, Chief Justice Hughes asserted that these cases (and others)
indicated that the Supreme Court could review state court decisions on federal
law, even if the plaintiffs would have lacked standing to bring the same suit in
lower federal court.225 As long as the state court found that it had jurisdiction
See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 437-46.
This point is made clear by Chief Justice Hughes’ discussion of Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S.
126 (1922). See also infra notes 218–224 and accompanying text.
217 Throughout his opinion, Chief Justice Hughes emphasized the importance of Supreme Court
review of state court decisions on federal law. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasizing that the state
court found that “members of the legislature had standing” and suggesting that a case involving federal
questions should not end in state court); id. at 442-43 (underscoring that Congress had repeatedly
expanded the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts); infra notes 218–227 and accompanying text.
218 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; Coleman, 307 U.S. at 439-41.
219 258 U.S. 130, 130-31 (1922).
220 See id. at 135-36.
221 Id. at 136.
222 See id. at 135-37 (holding that the amendment did not result in “so great an addition to the
electorate” that it was outside the scope of Article V).
223 258 U.S. 126, 127 (1922).
224 Id. at 127, 129-30 (“Plaintiff has only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require that
the Government be administered according to law . . . . Obviously this general right does not entitle
a private citizen to institute [a suit] in the federal courts”).
225 Interestingly, as Chief Justice Hughes observed, both opinions were penned by Justice
Brandeis. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 439-41, 440 n.4 (1939) (asserting that the Court must
have considered the jurisdictional issues in Leser, given that “on the same day, in an opinion . . . by
215
216
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over the federal claims (as the Kansas Supreme Court had in this case), the
Supreme Court could hear the appeal.226 The Chief Justice declared:
In the light of this course of decisions [permitting appeals from state courts on
federal questions], we find no departure from principle in recognizing . . . that
at least the twenty senators whose votes . . . would have been sufficient to defeat
[the] proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy
which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding the federal
questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review that decision.227

Somewhat ironically, however, after this ode to appellate review, Chief
Justice Hughes’ opinion largely dismissed the constitutional challenges as
nonjusticiable political questions.228
In a concurrence on behalf of four members of the Court, Justice
Frankfurter insisted that the legislators lacked standing to appeal.229 Notably,
Justice Frankfurter took it as common ground that the legislators could not
have filed suit in federal district court. Given that a Kansas legislator
“[c]learly . . . would have no standing had he brought suit in a federal court,”
the only question was whether the decision of the state court could “transmute
the general interest in these constitutional claims into the individualized legal
interest indispensable here.”230 Justice Frankfurter insisted that the answer
was no: Although the Kansas Supreme Court was free to hear whatever
“causes of action” it chose, the State could not “define the contours of the
authority of the federal courts, and more particularly of this Court.”231
Coleman was in large part a debate about the scope of Supreme Court
review of state court decisions on federal law. Indeed, that is how at least
some contemporary commentators construed the Justices’ standing
the same Justice [Mr. Justice Brandeis], jurisdiction had been denied to a federal court” in Fairchild);
see also id. at 438-46 (listing a string of cases in which the Supreme Court reviewed state court
decisions on federal law).
226 See id. at 437-38 (underscoring that the state court found that “members of the legislature
had standing . . . . Had the questions been solely state questions, the matter would have ended there”).
227 Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
228 See id. at 450-51 (concluding that Congress had “ultimate authority” to determine “the
efficacy of ratifications” and “whether . . . [an] amendment had lost its vitality through lapse of time
. . . . “). Interestingly, the Court failed to reach a decision on the justiciability of what was arguably
the legislators’ primary objection: the tie-breaking vote of the lieutenant governor. See id. at 436,
446-47 (noting that the Court was “equally divided” on this issue). For an explanation as to how the
Court could be equally divided on one issue in a case that involved nine Justices, see MARK
TUSHNET, THE HUGHES COURT (draft on file with author) (explaining that Justice McReynolds
failed to cast a vote on this issue before leaving on vacation).
229 See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 460, 460-70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
230 Id. at 465.
231 Id. at 462; see also id. at 466 n.6 (urging that the federal statutes governing appellate
jurisdiction over the state courts did not suggest that “Congress enlarged the jurisdiction of the
Court by removing the established requirement of legal interest”).
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analysis.232 Chief Justice Hughes assumed that a plaintiff could have standing
to appeal a state court ruling to the Supreme Court, even if the plaintiff could
not have brought the same suit in federal district court. Today, by contrast, it
is clear that the same standing requirements apply both at trial and on appeal
to any Article III court.233 It is also clear that this appellate standing rule may
bar Supreme Court review of some state court decisions on federal law.234 At
the time, those rules had not been established. As William Fletcher has
observed, “Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Coleman v. Miller . . .
provided the first full elaboration” of the rule today: the Supreme Court will
not review state court decisions on questions of federal law, unless the person
seeking review can demonstrate an Article III injury.235
2. The Nullification Theory
Supporters of institutional standing appear to have largely overlooked
Coleman’s emphasis on Supreme Court supervision of state courts. Instead,
these commentators argue that the Court upheld standing on a different
ground: the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaking vote “nullified” the votes of
the twenty senators who declined to ratify the Child Labor Amendment.236
232 See James Wm. Moore & Shirley Adelson, The Supreme Court: 1938 Term II. Rule-Making, Jurisdiction
and Administrative Review, 26 VA. L. REV. 697, 706-07 (1940) (stating Coleman was “probably consistent with
earlier cases,” to the extent it held that the senators could “invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, although they would not have had standing to sue initially in the federal courts.”). Contemporary
observers were more troubled by the Court’s decision to treat constitutional issues surrounding amendments
as nonjusticiable political questions. See id. (stating that the political question ruling was far “[l]ess
anticipated”). Notably, Coleman was the first case to declare such issues to be nonjusticiable. See Grove, Lost
History, supra note 198, at 1912, 1929-32, 1944-46 (“Throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth
century, federal courts adjudicated constitutional questions on the merits, including . . . the validity of
constitutional amendments . . . . Then, in . . . Coleman v. Miller, the Justices for the first time declined to rule
on the validity of an amendment . . . .”).
233 See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (“We need not decide today whether a
party seeking to intervene before a district court must satisfy . . . the requirements of Art. III. To
continue this suit [on appeal] in the absence of [the original defendant], the [intervenor] must satisfy
the requirements of Art. III.”).
234 See Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 78 n.4 (1991)
(“[T]he requirements of Article III plainly [do] not apply [in state court].”).
235 William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal
Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 275 (1990) (footnote omitted); see ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 617-18 (1989) (stating that the party seeking review from state court must demonstrate Article III
standing); see also Fletcher, supra, at 265 (arguing that “[s]tate courts should be required to adhere to
article III ‘case or controversy’ requirements” when they decide federal questions, so that their decisions
are subject to Supreme Court review).
236 See sources cited infra note 243. Some language in Coleman could be read this way, although (as I
emphasize through italics) many of the same quotes can also be read to support my argument that the case
was about appellate jurisdiction. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 446 (“In the light of this course of decisions
[upholding jurisdiction from state courts], . . . at least the twenty senators whose votes . . . would have been
sufficient to defeat the resolution . . . , have an interest in the controversy which, treated by the state court as a
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The idea is that (absent the tie-breaker) those twenty votes would have killed
the Kansas ratification; accordingly, those votes were “held for naught” by the
lieutenant governor’s action.237 There is language in Coleman to support this
theory (although much of that same language is also consistent with this
Article’s appellate review theory).238
This “nullification” construction also finds some support in Raines v. Byrd.
Although the bulk of Raines opposed claims of institutional injury, the Court
did not entirely foreclose such claims.239 And in discussing Chief Justice
Hughes’ opinion, the Raines Court stated:
[O]ur holding in Coleman stands (at most) for the proposition that legislators
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative
Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go
into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.240

The Raines Court seems to have been primarily concerned with
distinguishing Coleman from the case before it, which was brought by only six
legislators.241 Moreover, Raines was clearly no ringing endorsement of “vote
nullification” or any other claim of institutional injury—as demonstrated by
the qualifier “at most” and the reasoning in the remainder of the opinion,
which emphasized the lack of historical support for such claims.242
Nevertheless, scholars and jurists insist that Coleman and Raines can be
read to support a range of institutional standing claims, at least for a
legislature.243 Under this view, the main problem in Raines was the small
basis for entertaining and deciding the federal questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review that
decision.”); see also id. at 438 (“Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose votes against ratification
have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes
would have been sufficient to defeat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes. Petitioners come directly within the provisions of the statute
governing our appellate jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)).
237 Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438.
238 See supra note 236.
239 The Court, for example, “attach[ed] some importance” to the fact that the six plaintiff
legislators in that case were not “authorized to represent their respective Houses,” although it quickly
added that it “need not now decide” whether such authorization would have altered its standing
determination. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997).
240 Id. at 823 (citation omitted).
241 Indeed, the Court emphasized that it need not decide whether Coleman might “be
distinguished in other ways.” Id. at 824 n.8 (noting that Coleman might not apply to “a similar suit”
brought by federal legislators or “brought in federal court, since that decision depended on the fact
that the Kansas Supreme Court ‘treated’ the senators’ interest in their votes ‘as a basis for
entertaining and deciding the federal questions’”).
242 Id. at 823; see also supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text (noting that Raines
underscored the lack of historical support for institutional injuries).
243 See Mank, supra note 4, at 188; Nash, supra note 4, at 349-58, 369, 376-78 (criticizing Raines as offering
an “unnecessarily stingy” view of congressional standing, but arguing that the case and Coleman support claims
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number of legislative plaintiffs; six legislators could not possibly speak for an
institution. By contrast, the institution itself is much more analogous to the
twenty “no” voters in Coleman. Just as those twenty “no” votes were “nullified”
by the lieutenant governor’s tie-breaker, an institution’s power may be
“nullified” by outside interference.
This nullification idea has proven central to many recent assertions of
institutional injury.244 In Burwell, the House alleged that the executive’s
payments to insurers “injured the House by nullifying” its decision not to
appropriate funds.245 In Arizona State Legislature, the Supreme Court found
that the state legislature’s power over redistricting was “completely
nullif[ied]” by the state constitutional amendment transferring that power to
an independent commission.246 And in United States v. Windsor, the House of
Representatives argued that its “core lawmaking function [was] ‘completely
nullified’” by a lower court decision invalidating the Defense of Marriage Act
on equal protection grounds.247 Indeed, the House in Windsor went further,
stating that the “institutional harm to the House’s core constitutional
of institutional injury); see also Greene, supra note 9, at 584-88, 593-94, 598 (asserting that the cases support
standing to challenge a presidential nonenforcement decision).
244 In June 2017, around 200 legislators relied on a “vote nullification” theory to support standing in a
suit alleging that President Trump violated the Emoluments Clause. See Complaint at 50-51, Blumenthal v.
Trump, No. 1:17-cv-01154 (D.D.C. June 14, 2017), 2017 WL 2561946 (stating that the President “nullified” their
votes by failing to seek congressional authorization before accepting payments from foreign dignitaries); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“[N]o Person holding any Office [under the United States] shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, accept [any Emolument] from any . . . foreign State.”). In September 2018, a
federal district court held that each individual member of Congress has standing to allege this institutional
injury. That is, the district court did not rely on the fact that the suit was brought by a large number of
legislators. See Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F.Supp.3d 45, 58, 61-63 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding that Raines and
Coleman establish that a legislator may have standing to assert an “institutional injury . . . when a legislator’s
vote has been completely nullified” and that the “[p]laintiffs adequately allege that the President has
completely nullified their votes in the past because he has accepted prohibited foreign emoluments as though
Congress had provided its consent” and “will completely nullify their votes in the future” to the extent that
he “continue[s] this practice”); see also id. at 63 (asserting that the Supreme Court has not held that “an
institutional claim may be brought only by the institution”). Notably, the district court in this case went further
than many current scholars. Although some early commentators supported individual legislator standing to
assert institutional injuries, most recent commentators have suggested that such claims should be brought only
by institutions–or at least by a large enough number of legislators to effect legal change on an issue (and, thus,
represent the institution as a whole). See supra notes 4–9 and accompanying text (citing scholarship that
supports the standing of institutions and that argues, for example, that thirty-four senators could bring suit to
assert the Senate’s role in ratifying treaties, because that is the number—one third of the Senate plus one—
that could prevent ratification).
245 Opposition of the U.S. House of Representatives to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 26, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 26 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2015).
246 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2015).
247 The House claimed that the injury arose in part from the fact that the executive branch refused to
defend the law in court. BLAG Brief, supra note 2, at 12-14. Although the majority in Windsor did not address
the House’s standing, see 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013), Justice Alito found that the House suffered an
institutional injury, because the lower court decision striking down the law “limited Congress’ power to
legislate.” See id. at 2712-14 (Alito, J., dissenting) (asserting that Coleman supported standing).
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authority” stemmed in part from the fact that the lower court had applied
intermediate scrutiny.248 According to the House: “The decision below, if not
reversed, will permanently diminish the House’s legislative power by
imposing a heightened standard of review for legislation that classifies on the
basis of sexual orientation.”249
As these examples suggest, the “nullification” theory attributed to
Coleman v. Miller has become the basis of many modern claims of institutional
injury. Coleman, however, is a thin reed on which to base such a revolution in
standing doctrine. The bulk of Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion emphasized
standing to seek Supreme Court review of state court decisions. And Hughes
at no point suggested that plaintiffs could raise “institutional injuries” in
lower federal court. Given that Coleman does not clearly endorse the concept
of “institutional injury,” and given that such a concept is problematic as a
matter of constitutional theory and at odds with the bulk of our history, it
seems more reasonable to read Coleman as a case about appellate standing
under a now-outdated rule.
III. FURTHER REASONS TO LIMIT GOVERNMENT STANDING
This Article’s argument against institutional standing rests primarily on
constitutional text, structure, history, and precedent. But adherence to the
historical limits on government standing also furthers other constitutional
values. First, denying standing to assert institutional injuries serves as a
valuable reminder that individuals, rather than institutions, are the
rightsholders in our constitutional system. Second, this rule preserves
important limitations on the federal judicial power by requiring government
institutions to battle one another on their own turf. Notably, in an era of
increasing party polarization, this restriction serves not only to constrain but
also to protect the judiciary from becoming embroiled in partisan controversies.
A. Individuals as Rightsholders
As discussed, the Supreme Court’s structural constitutional jurisprudence
often focuses on government institutions, rather than the principles
underlying our constitutional scheme. This approach is defensible, to the
extent the Court aims to create workable doctrine for lower courts to apply.
But as Rebecca Brown and others have powerfully argued, there is “no

248 BLAG Brief, supra note 2, at 13-14; see Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185, 188 (2d
Cir. 2012) (applying intermediate scrutiny). The Supreme Court has not settled on a standard of
scrutiny for claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation.
249 BLAG Brief, supra note 2, at 13.
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historical support” for the idea that the Constitution protects “the
institutional interests of [government entities] themselves.”250
Supporters of institutional standing appear to have overlooked this
fundamental point. These scholars and jurists treat institutions, rather than
individuals, as the primary beneficiaries of the structural constitutional
scheme. Under this view, government institutions may even have a right to
their constitutional powers and duties.251 Aziz Huq has carried these
arguments about institutions as rightsholders to their logical conclusion. Huq
not only supports institutional standing but also contends that private
parties—even those who have suffered a concrete injury—should not have
standing to raise separation of powers or federalism claims.252
Consistent with the premises of institutional standing, Huq argues that when
private plaintiffs claim violations of the structural Constitution, they assert the
“rights of institutions such as states and branches.”253 Accordingly, Huq reasons,
private suits to enforce the structural Constitution are a form of “third-party
standing.”254 In our legal system, third-party standing claims are generally
disfavored; that is, courts are reluctant to let a plaintiff raise the constitutional
rights of someone else.255 Building on this doctrine, Huq concludes that private
individuals should not have standing to “vindicate the constitutional interests of
third-party institutions.”256 Instead, “structural constitutional values are best
entrusted in the courts to the institutions they directly benefit.”257
Brown, supra note 68, at 1518; see supra subsection I.B.1.
See supra subsection I.B.2-3.
See Huq, supra note 4, at 1440. Huq argues that even a criminal defendant (like Alfonso
Lopez) should not have standing to challenge his conviction on the ground that the relevant statute
violated the structural Constitution. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Huq, supra
note 4, at 1514-15 (“Even when a litigant is hauled into court as a criminal or a civil defendant . . . no
standing ought to be allowed.”). Huq identifies only one exception: private individuals should have
standing to raise violations of Article III. See id. at 1520-21 (arguing that “the protections of Article
III” are “part and parcel of the asserted individual interest in fair adjudication”).
253 Huq, supra note 4, at 1458; supra subsections I.B.2-3.
254 Id. at 1436-37 (characterizing “[i]ndividual standing for the structural constitution” as “a
species of otherwise impermissible third-party standing”).
255 Under third-party standing doctrine, the Court grants the plaintiff “standing to assert the
rights of another.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004) (noting that such standing is
generally disfavored); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 510 (1975) (recognizing limits on the
ability of third parties to invoke the court’s remedial powers).
256 Huq, supra note 4, at 1457-58 (“Canonical accounts of standing suggest that the federal
courthouse door is open only to individuals seeking redress for violations of their own rights. How
then is it that some individual litigants have standing under the structural constitution for the rights
of institutions such as states and branches?”).
257 Id. at 1439-40 (arguing, on policy grounds, that institutions can best determine when to
raise structural claims). Notably, Huq does not seek to articulate the boundaries of institutional
standing. He assumes that government entities and officials have broad standing to vindicate
structural claims. See id. at 1440 n.16, 1514 (“In the mine run of cases, it is the case that the branch,
the state, or an official of one of these governmental entities will have standing to raise a claim.”).
250
251
252
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Huq’s thesis is a logical implication of the argument for institutional
standing. As discussed, that argument rests on the assumption that institutions
have a particularized interest in their respective powers—an interest greater
than any private citizen. If institutions are the primary beneficiaries (indeed,
the rightsholders) of their constitutional powers, why not give them the
exclusive authority to determine when to assert their “rights”?
But as I have demonstrated, this view inverts our constitutional order. The
constitutional structure was designed to provide a workable, but limited,
government that would better serve the public than had the Articles of
Confederation. Government institutions are the vessels through which
constitutional powers and duties flow; they are not the beneficiaries of the
scheme. Denying institutional standing reminds us of this basic principle:
Individuals, not institutions, are the rightsholders in our constitutional system.258
This point also underscores why the institutional disputes discussed in this
Article should not be dismissed on political question grounds. Some readers
may be inclined to say that courts could use the political question doctrine to
avoid, for example, a Senate lawsuit over the Recess Appointments Clause or
a House of Representatives claim under the Origination Clause. But under
current doctrine, if the Supreme Court designates an issue as a “political
question,” the federal judiciary cannot decide that constitutional issue at all.259
Accordingly, such an approach would prevent a private plaintiff, even one with
a concrete injury, from bringing suit.260
B. Protecting the Judicial Power in an Era of Polarization
Denying institutional standing not only reminds us that individuals are
the beneficiaries in our constitutional scheme but also promotes Article III
values. Standing doctrine seeks in part to discern, perhaps imperfectly,261
when litigants have an interest that merits judicial resolution, while leaving
many other matters to the political process.262 As I have argued, governments
258 Notably, Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins have emphasized a similar point in arguing
for limits on state standing. See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L.
REV. 387, 517, 520 (1995) (“[A] narrower view of state standing [can] enhance the status of individuals
as the primary beneficiaries of constitutional guaranties.”); see also Ann Woolhandler, Governmental
Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 210, 212, 229-30, 233, 236 (2014) (reiterating
this theme in arguing that the federal and state governments should be permitted to sue one another
only with congressional authorization).
259 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012).
260 Private plaintiffs have raised claims under these constitutional provisions. See NLRB v.
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (Recess Appointments Clause); United States v. MunozFlores, 495 U.S. 385, 389-96, 397-400 (1990) (Origination Clause).
261 See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
262 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“The several doctrines that have grown up
to elaborate [the “case” or “controversy”] requirement are ‘founded in concern about the proper—
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must have standing when they seek to impose sanctions on individuals; due
process principles require judicial review in such cases. For that reason, courts
properly recognize government standing in enforcement, defense, and
congressional contempt cases. But under our constitutional structure,
government institutions have various tools to object to incursions by other
government entities—and thereby to enforce the public interest in the
structural Constitution. That is, government institutions can battle one
another, without the intervention of an Article III court.
There are pressing reasons today to adhere to the structural and historical
limits on government standing. Notably, such restrictions on the federal
judicial power serve not only to constrain but also to protect the federal
judiciary. These rules help safeguard “the judiciary’s credibility and
reputation” by ensuring that it does not become embroiled “in every
important political or constitutional controversy.”263 Denying institutional
standing furthers this important purpose. This restriction helps protect the
judiciary from becoming a battleground for partisan conflicts.
In an era of growing party polarization,264 government officials are likely
to bring suit, not to redress alleged “institutional injuries,” but rather to fulfill
partisan goals.265 Indeed, partisanship seems to be at the heart of recent
institutional standing cases. In Burwell, the Republican-controlled House of
Representatives complained about the Obama administration’s
implementation of the Affordable Care Act. But once the Trump
administration took over, those same lawmakers asked the federal district
and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 498 (1975)); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“Lack of standing
within the narrow confines of Art. III jurisdiction does not impair the right to assert [one’s] views
in the political forum or at the polls.”).
263 See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003-07 (2002) (stating that justiciability tests
help protect “the judiciary’s credibility and reputation” by limiting its role in political and constitutional
controversies). This idea is connected to the notion that the federal courts’ authority may depend on
their “diffuse support” among the public. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of
Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658 (1992) (asserting, based on an empirical
study, that the Supreme Court at that time enjoyed “diffuse support” among the public).
264 See Mark D. Brewer, The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict Within
the American Electorate, 58 POL. RES. Q. 219, 219-220 (2005) (“By the end of the 1980s, partisanship
in Congress had risen dramatically and has remained at a high level ever since.”); Gary C. Jacobson,
A House and Senate Divided: The Clinton Legacy and the Congressional Elections of 2000, 116 POL. SCI.
Q. 5, 6 (2001) (arguing that, in the 1990s, “the stark partisan polarization among the parties’
politicians . . . accelerated”).
265 As Neal Devins and I have demonstrated, in the past two decades, when lawmakers have
participated in litigation (even as amici), they have done so largely for partisan reasons. See Grove
& Devins, supra note 13, at 617-21; Neal Devins, Congress, the Courts, and Party Polarization: Why
Congress Rarely Checks the President and Why the Courts Should Not Take Congress’s Place, 21 CHAP. L.
REV. 55, 72-76 (2018) (“[P]olarization has transformed the role of institutional counsel in ways that
reflect profound differences between the House and Senate.”).
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court to put the litigation on hold.266 The House did not press the issue, even
when the Trump administration continued the very same spending practices
that the House deemed “unconstitutional” under President Obama.267 A
similar story underlies Arizona State Legislature. When the independent
commission was first established in 2000—and even after it created its first
set of districts in 2001—the Republican-controlled state legislature did not
object.268 The legislature filed suit a decade later (in 2012), after the
independent commission adopted a second districting scheme—one that was
far less favorable to the Republican Party.269
Some readers might argue that the increase in partisanship also weakens
the structural tools that institutions can use to enforce the structural
Constitution. That is, in our currently polarized political environment, the
House and Senate will not use their appropriations or investigative authority
to challenge a same-party President; likewise, state officials will not take on
other state institutions controlled by their ideological allies. Notably, some
examples cut against that assumption. The Senate has asserted its role in the
treaty process; the House has defended its power over revenue bills; and
presidents objected to the legislative veto, without regard to party.270
Nevertheless, there is no question that government officials may often be
motivated by partisan concerns, when they decide whether to use structural tools
to defend institutional prerogatives. That may well be cause for concern, but it is
no reason to give those same government officials broader access to the courts.
Instead, as Burwell and Arizona State Legislature illustrate, to the extent that
government officials are motivated by partisanship, those same motivations will
apply to litigation. Permitting institutional standing simply allows government
institutions to take their disputes—partisan and otherwise—to court.
As discussed, this Article aims primarily to show that government
standing to assert “institutional injuries” is undermined by constitutional
266 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 676 Fed. Appx. 1, 2016 WL 8292200 (D.C.
Cir. Dec. 5, 2016) (granting the motion to hold the appeal in abeyance).
267 In Burwell, the House complained about subsidies that the Obama administration provided to health
insurance companies to offset the costs of insuring low-income individuals. See supra notes 81–85 and
accompanying text. The Trump administration paid those same subsidies until October 2017, when the
President announced that the executive would cease payment. See Robert Pear, Maggie Haberman, & Reed
Abelson, President Ending Health Subsidies for Poor People, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2017, at A1,
https://tucson.com/news/state-and-regional/republicans-file-new-challenge-to-congressional-districtlines/article_b4e17c62-6d33-5aa4-9221-82f498c12588.html (reporting on the Trump administration’s decision
to discontinue subsidizing insurance companies that pay out-of-pocket costs to low-income policy-holders).
268 See Howard Fischer, Republicans File New Challenge to Congressional District Lines, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR (Sept. 24, 2013) (reporting that, in 2001, “there was little interest by Republicans in challenging
[the redistricting process] because the lines . . . were probably more favorable to the GOP.”).
269 See id. (noting that Democrats took five of nine seats after the 2012 redistricting).
270 See CHAFETZ, supra note 58, at 31-33. President Carter fought with a Democraticcontrolled Congress over the legislative veto. See CRAIG, supra note 191, at 108-09.
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theory, history and precedent. But adhering to the historical limits on
government standing will also serve broader Article III values—by helping
to ensure that the judiciary does not become embroiled in repeated partisan
conflicts. Courts are thus well-advised to enforce those limits and deny claims
of “institutional injury.” Government institutions should carry out their
intergovernmental battles in the statehouse, not the courthouse.
CONCLUSION
Government standing to assert institutional injuries is in tension with our
constitutional scheme. The provisions of our structural Constitution are not
designed for the benefit of institutions, but for the benefit of the entire public.
The goal is to create a workable, but limited, federal government that will not
arbitrarily infringe on individual liberty. Although there may be reason to
doubt whether our system of separated powers and federalism in fact serves
these purposes, there is no question that individuals, not institutions, are the
beneficiaries of this scheme. Institutions have no greater interest in their
constitutional powers and duties than any other member of society.
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